Humanitarian Technology: Strategic Nonviolent Struggle

Оставлен klachkov Втр, 2013-10-29 14:39

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences 10 (2013 6) 1526-1543

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Pavel V. Klachkov*
Department of Expertise and Analytics of the Governour
of the Krasnoyarsk Territory
110 Mira, Krasnoyarsk, 660009 Russia

This article considers strategic nonviolent struggle as a complex humanitarian technology aimed at ensuring the change of state power by weakening the structural, functional and genetic integrity of the state mainly by conviction and psychological manipulations. The author comes to the conclusion that a complete answer to this challenge includes not only opposition to destructive entities, but also strengthening of the integrity of the state by uniting three abovementioned types of the latter.

Keywords: strategic nonviolent struggle, strategic nonviolence, soft power, colour revolutions, humanitarian technologies.

© Siberian Federal University. All rights reserved

W. Casey, who is considered to be the most powerful director of the CIA in the history of the organization, wrote in his book: “In our time it is especially important to understand how necessary intelligence, covert operations and organized resistance movements are ... In the future, in crisis situations, these methods can be more productive than missiles and satellites. Their success tells us to use dissidents against the powerful centers and totalitarian governments”1. Both complex character and high relevance of the “color revolutions” in the past decade in the Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan count in favor of careful consideration of these methods.

The founder of the humanitarian technology2 of “strategic nonviolent struggle” that underlies “color revolutions” is G. Sharp. At the beginning of his career he was researching the teachings of civil disobedience of G.D. Toro and M.K. Gandhi. He devoted a separate monograph to the ideas and practices of the latter3. Of course, G. Sharp was familiar with the works of many thinkers. In particular, he was close in his views were close to the views of the 16th century French philosopher Etienne de la Boétie. The latter asserted the following: “If they (the tyrants) are not provided with anything, if they are not being obeyed, without fighting, without opposition, they remain naked and broken, and there is nothing they can afford, as a sprout, which dries up and dies, if the root has no soil”4. However, the particular importance of the Gandhism is clear based upon the fact that the founder of the latter, as well as the American political researcher, was not only a theoretician, but also a practicing politician. The views of the Indian thinker was reflected in the work of the follower and colleague of G. Sharp, a retired colonel, R.L. Helvey: Gandhi appears there in the chapter devoted to the political thinkers, most significant for strategic nonviolent struggle (in a non-trivial company with N. Machiavelli and C. Clausewitz)5 . Thus, a certain relation of the technology of nonviolent revolutions with the doctrine of Satyagraha (perseverance in the truth) is beyond any doubt.

According to the theory of M.K. Gandhi, violence only breeds violence, while nonviolence breaks this vicious spiral. Satyagraha is based on the desire to influence the judgment and conscience of the opponent through non-violence (ahimsa), and the willingness to endure pain and suffering. An important element of this teaching is to avoid interaction with the authorities in the forms prescribed by the sovereign. The followers of M.K. Gandhi refused to buy British goods, receive government titles and awards, to be on the civil and military service, boycotted schools and administrative offices, while creating alternative social structures. The example was Mahatma himself, who in 1920 returned the rewards for his participation in the wars in South Africa to the King6 , and four years later, protested against his early release from prison, not wanting favorsfrom the government7 .

“The rights also entail obligations to the state”, young M.K. Gandhi thought once started his legal practice in South Africa8 . He faced the arbitrariness of British colonial officials and came to the conclusion that, by refusing to meet the state face to face, the citizens thereby make the latter inoperative. Among the most successful examples of such policies is refusal of the Bardoli District to pay the land tax (resulting in tax reduction)9 , as well as demonstrative and widespread violation of the salt monopoly of the government (400 km trip to the seacoast)10. There were fires with British goods all over India11. It got to the point that the Indians ignored the visit of the Crown Prince of Wales. The streets of the cities along the route of the Prince seemed dead at the time of his presence12. And in 1946, after the Indian National Congress adopted the anti-British resolution “Get out of India!”, Gandhi said: “Each of us from now on should consider him-/herself a free man or a woman and act as if we had already got free of imperialism”13 .

The symbol of Satyagraha was Charkha, a traditional Indian spinning wheel. The followers of this teaching did not buy British textile products, preferring their own homespun goods14 . M.K. Gandhi demanded from his followers to work personally on a manual spinning wheel. He reasoned it this way: “Why do I, who does not have to work to be fed, also need to spin? Because I eat something that does not belong to me. I live by the labor of my fellow citizens”15. Thus, spinning was not only a symbol, but a way of ensuring the socio-cultural integrity of the highly fragmented Indian society. Breaking the ties that bound his country with England, Mahatma simultaneously spun threads to unite India itself. It is a paradox that decades before this “jewel of the British Empire” got it’s independence. M.K. Gandhi spent most of his efforts not to fight the mother country, but to consolidate India. To do this, he worked on the reconciliation of the supporters of Hinduism and Islam16, as well as on the integration of “untouchable” into the Indian society”17.

The tactics of the Indian political strategist that met both objective geopolitical and geoeconomic realities and traditions of the Indian society, proved to be extremely effective. It is worth noting that it is deeply rooted in the Indian spiritual tradition18. It is known that the true followers of Satyagraha were supposed to make a vow of truth, non-violence or love, innocence, refusal from property, etc. (by the way M.K. Gandhi was influenced in his views by ideas of L.N. Tolstoy)19. An important component of the movement was voluntary acceptance of a martyred mission by its participants20. However, the great Hindu called himself a “practical idealist” and intended his theory of non-violence not for angels or saints, but for ordinary people21 . Moreover, Mahatma said that he “would rather prefer that India resorted to arms to defend its honor, than it became a helpless victim of its own dishonor because of its cowardice...”22 .

The final chapter of G. Sharp’s monograph “Gandhi as a Political Strategist” is called “Non-violence: a moral principle or a political technology?” The author tends to dispose of the widespread opinion that the use of nonviolent means in India was determined by spiritual, religious or psychological features of the Hindus23. He also drops a thought about the difference between non-violence as ethics and nonviolent acts as a practical technology24. To prove it he uses quotations from the works of M.K. Gandhi, in particular from the letter dated July 1943, where he wrote: “I admit that there are many of those, who totally follow my theory of non-violence. Nevertheless, one should not forget my other words: for my movement it is not necessary that all its participants are the followers of this theory, to some extent or totally. It is enough if people simply follow the rules of nonviolent acts”25 .
G. Sharp and his followers went the way of universalisation and instrumentalization of the teaching of nonviolent struggle. They decided to bring this teaching to the level of a technology, providing the application of the humanitarian arms of the East against itself. As noted by G. Sharp himself in conversation with R.L. Helvey, “strategic nonviolent struggle deals with mastering of the political power and depriving it of others. It has no relation to pacifism, moral or religious beliefs”26. If M.K. Gandhi considered the idea “to seek one’s rescue looking for the external forces and the help from other countries” to be dangerous, the followers of G. Sharp used the latter without any doubt.

As MGIMO professor M.A. Khrustalev notes, before the presidency of R. Reagan the traditional foreign policy of the United States was the support of the military dictatorships (especially in Latin America). After this, the line had changed and, leaving his post, this head of the United States said that during his rule forty dictatorships were deprived27. Such a change in the foreign policy claimed the theory and practice of “peaceful revolutions”.

In 1983, G. Sharp created a programme of nonviolent actions at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. His first research was focused on the possibilities of applying the tactics of civil disobedience by the population of Eastern Europe in the event of invasion of armed forces of the Warsaw Pact Organization. In parallel, this political expert organized the Albert Einstein Institute of Boston28, which started active practical activities since late 1980s29 . The first major “client” was the Democratic Alliance of Burma. In this country, now called the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, technologists of nonviolent struggle worked for years. This is where R.L. Helvey joined them. Moreover, the members of the Institute worked with the progressive party of Taiwan and with the supporters of Dalai Lama, took part in the overthrow of M. Noriega in Panama. Two weeks before the beginning of the infamous Tiananmen Square incident G. Sharp and B. Jenkins arrived in Beijing 30.

One of the most successful projects of the Albert Einstein Institute was the support of the separatist movements in the Soviet Baltic31. As stated in the work by G. Sharp, his book “Civil Defense: the Post-war Weapon System” was actively spread in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and the author himself, along with his associate B. Jenkins worked in these republics in November-December 1991. Later this book was published in Latvia with forewords of the former and current ministers of defense of this republic32. According to the apologetic articles in the European mass media, the organization of G. Sharp was involved in the recent events of the Arab Spring33. The official website of the Institute has versions not only in Chinese, Arabic and Burma languages, but also in Serbian, Kyrgyz, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and, of course, Russian. 34 .

The Albert Einstein Institute is not a monopolist. The International Centre for Nonviolent Conflicts headed by Dr. Ackerman and former military J. DuVall, also “promotes and encourages the use of nonviolent civil strategy with a view to establish and protect democracy and human rights around the world ... and provides assistance in training and sending field instructors to deepen the theoretical knowledge and practical skills to use nonviolent methods in conflicts around the world”35 .

R.L. Helvey determines the mass disobedience as “nonviolent struggle (protest, non-cooperation), strongly and actively applied for political purposes”36. According to G. Sharp, the term is intended to distinguish nonviolent struggle against pacifism and moral or religious non-resistance. It is a deliberate challenge to the authorities, a refusal to obey. This technology is used in the political sphere, it’s purpose is the political power. The term is used to denote actions that help to intercept the control of dictatorship over state institutions37 .
G. Sharp considers that “after all, political power is based on social cooperation and actions of the masses, but not on violence”38. He asserts: “When nonviolent actions are performed by many people and the main social institutes, they are able to paralyze and even destroy what they were aimed at39. It seems that peaceful movement should be interested in achieving consensus with the authorities by negotiations, but G. Sharp doubts this way of solving conflicts. He concedes negotiations only as a tactic means: “If Democrats agree to stop resistance in response to stop repressions, they may be disappointed. This happens seldom”40. It is worth noting that even though M.K. Gandhi abandoned negotiations (in particular, with Lord Reading in 1919)41, he often held them successfully finding mutual compromises with the colonial authorities (for example, Deli Pact of 1931)42. In general, Mahatma thought that Satyagraha requires not saving efforts to achieve worthy agreements with opponents43 .

R.L. Helvey in his characteristics of strategic nonviolent struggle uses a typical military analogue: “Military victory is achieved by destruction of the potential of the opponent and (or) his/her will to continue the fight. In this respect nonviolent struggle is different from an armed conflict only in the systems of weapons”44 . He also writes: “Like artillery changed the nature of war in the times of Machiavelli, the technology gave us opportunities to change the way of conducting nonviolent conflicts. Computers, Internet access, mobile and satellite phones, coding programmes, television and radio are the main weapons of nonviolent struggle”45.

G. Sharp asserts that the beginning of nonviolent struggle requires solving of four firstpriority tasks: “to strengthen resolution, selfbelief and ability to struggle in the depressed people; to strengthen independent social groups and institutes of the depressed people; to create strong internal resistance; to prepare a reasonable strategic plan and put it into practice” 46. He also names “three key factors that determine to which extent the power of the government will remain uncontrolled: 1) relative desire of the population to limit its power; 2) relative power of independent organizations and institutes that aim at shutting off the sources of such power; 3) relative ability of the population to refuse the authorities in agreement and support”47 .

Strategic nonviolent struggle is not an extemporaneous creativity of the masses48 . As R.L. Helvey underlines “It is not a happening, but a well planned and realized strategy of destructing the dictatorship”49 . Struggle involves development and successive implementation of a general strategy, which is specified in strategy, tactics and methods. First of all, strategists should answer some questions: “What prevents from achieving freedom? What may help to achieve it? What aspects of the dictatorship are particularly strong? What are its weaknesses? How vulnerable is the source of its power? What are the strengths of the Democrats and the population as a whole? What are the weaknesses of the democratic forces, and how they may be overcome? What is the status of third parties indirectly involved in the conflict, which help or could help either the dictatorship or the democratic movement?”50 .

Strategic planning “requires deep understanding of the whole situation of the conflict, including physical, historical, government, military, cultural, social, political, psychological, economic, and international factors. Strategies can be developed only in the context of a particular struggle and its background”51. That is why it is impossible” to create a general strategic plan, which can fit all liberation movements. Each struggle for the overthrow of the dictatorship and establishment of democracy will be different in a way”52. As noted by G.W.F. Hegel, every nation “has such special circumstances, every era happens to be such an individual condition that ... it is necessary and possible to make only those decisions that are derived from this very condition”53 .

Talking about the qualities the strategists require, G. Sharp himself turns to the military analogy: “In order to prepare a military strategy, military officers get to know the structure, tactics, logic, ammunition, geographical features, etc.; in the same way, developing a plan of nonviolent struggle, it is necessary to understand the nature and the strategic principles of nonviolent struggle. However, knowledge alone will not create the strategy. To formulate the strategy of the fight, we need information and creative spirit”54 . “The inefficiency of template approaches and stereotyped solutions is due to the fact that “the conflict, where political defiance is applied is a constantly changing battlefield of action and reaction”55 .
If Machiavelli appeals to the wise sovereign “to take measures to ensure that citizens always and under all circumstances have the need for the sovereign and the state”56, G. Sharp offers “the fighters against the dictatorship to achieve exactly the opposite: “development of autonomous (social, economic, political and cultural) institutions is consistently expanding the democratic space and narrowing the control of the dictatorship”57 . In some cases, he finds it possible to develop a “parallel” (alternative) government, which citizens and civil institutions will be ready to obey. “Then the dictatorship will gradually but with an increasing speed get deprived of the properties of the government”58.

If French students rioted in 1968 with the slogan “Be realistic: demand the impossible!”59 , the “strategic nonviolent struggle” avoids such an approach. G. Sharp urges the opposition not to overestimate its strengths (in particular, to avoid the repetition of the events of 1989 in the Tiananmen Square). If the “frontal attack” at this stage of the struggle does not lead to the desired result, the political analyst recommends to resort to “selective strategies of resistance”. They suggest the concentration of forces “on specific issues: social, economic or political. They should be chosen in such a way, that a part of the social and political system remains beyond the control of dictators or gets out of it, and also that the plans of the authorities are hindered”. Such a campaign should strike “at the vulnerabilities of the dictatorship”60.

G. Sharp emphasizes that the opposition should use “weaknesses” of the authorities. Among them he names the following typical features: “The system can be inert, that is less able to adapt quickly to new situations”, “being afraid of angering the chiefs, subordinates may give inaccurate or incomplete information, which prevents the dictators from taking appropriate decisions”, “ineptitude and ignorance of the bureaucratic apparatus or excessive control can extremely reduce the functioning of the system”61. Generally speaking, the political analyst states, that “despite its apparent strengths, all dictatorships have weaknesses: internal inefficiency, institutional inefficiency, personal feuds and conflicts between organizations and departments”62 .

Therefore, it is appropriate to recall on a general pattern determined by A. Toffler: “Every system ... can only operate at a certain speed. Too slow –and it gets disintegrated, too fast –and it shatters. All systems are composed of subsystems that operate in a similar manner only within the certain velocity amplitude”63. Imposing a higher rate of a combat, the opposition could gain an advantage if the authorities are not ready for such a mode. As pointed out by V. Shved, in 1990, the Lithuanian “Sąjūdis” responded to all the statements of Moscow within a day or two, while it took Moscow up to two months or more to respond. In fact, the Centre responded when the urgency of the problem has already been exhausted64 .

G. Sharp also recommends to use the sharpening of class, cultural or ethnic conflicts65 . The researcher notes that both in Georgia and the Ukraine “real social problems and stress were used to launch the revolutionary flywheel”66 . Indeed, as A. Toffler wrote, “... when the system is highly unstable, non-linear effects are multiplied. Great efforts of the authorities can give small results. Slight circumstances may initiate the collapse of the regime. Like an overtoasted slice of bread may lead to divorce”67.

R.L. Helvey recommends to turn to the involvement of all the forces of the civil society into the struggle. He points out that almost all organizations “contain the sources of power, and provide a framework for collective actions”68 . This is quite logical because, as noted by V.V. Iliin and A. Panarin the communities “have inherent behavioural features and forms that are not typical for individuals: they are formed not in the process of an individual life, but during the collective mutual development, interaction (multiplication of the merger of personal energies, combinative reflexes, imitation, suggestion”69 .

Talking about the organizational structure of the nonviolent movements, R.L. Helvey notes that a hierarchy is not typical for it. “The general way to get together different interests, abilities and personalities, or opposition groups is to develop an “umbrella” organization for the purpose of struggling. The other way is, when the latter develops its own “headquarters core”, which represents all or some of the members. Initially, it may be better to combine the participating organizations around the issues rather than trying to create a unified organization”70 .

However, towards the end of the book R.L. Helvey determines “the opinion that the struggle for democracy requires democratic organizational structures for the management of the conflict as erroneous. This is a nonviolent, but, nevertheless, war. It requires leadership and strict discipline”71. “As in any war, decision-making by a committee is inappropriate. Ideally, at the strategic level, someone must be responsible for deciding when and where the campaign will be carried out, while other individuals should be responsible for carrying out these fights and campaigns. At each level within the movement, the task should not be set without specifying the person responsible for its implementation. The responsibility is always individual”72. Herewith, the author mentions, that one-man management does not deny broad participation in preparation and presentation of recommendations for the decision-making person73 .

R.L. Helvey frankly writes about the suitability of foreign experts’ participation in “nonviolent struggle”, who have a wealth of knowledge and skills74. Answering the tough questions of the opponents in this respect, the role of foreigners should be positioned as “necessary technical assistance, which has no governing authority and is strictly accountable”75. It is worth noting, that during training and consulting of new generations of “freedom fighters” he advises to attract “veterans of nonviolent conflicts” having proved themselves useful in other countries”76 .

A. Butkevicius, a Lithuanian student of G. Sharp, emphasizes: “In the Soviet Union in the military environment there were no designed psychological operations, everybody acted using a single, very primitive scheme”77 .

As noted by D. Fraser, propaganda is “an activity or art that makes people behave the way they would not have behaved without it”. In the opinion of this author, the initial target of propaganda is not the mind, but such emotions as fear, pride, greed, ambition, etc.78 R.L. Helvey agrees with J. Ellul, who defines propaganda as “an expression of opinions or actions taken by individuals or groups to influence the opinions and actions of other individuals or groups with predefined objectives and through psychological manipulation”79.Herewith, a retired U.S. Army colonel reasonably observes: “Contrary to the popular belief that the facts speak for themselves, in reality, the facts have a meaning only in a context”80. He also emphasizes that a journalist working in the genre of special propaganda, should imagine him-/herself as a politician. All his/her efforts should be aimed only at “condemning the opponent with all the facts that have an effect on the population and indicate what to do to solve the problem (and, unsurprisingly, political changes will always be an outcome)”81. R.L. Helvey also gives some specific recommendations on working with foreign mass media82.
Speaking about the role of propaganda, it is appropriate to recall that after World War I, military theorists almost unanimously acknowledged: promotion is a part of the art of war. The Englishman P.G. Warburton said: “In our time, the main objective of the war is not to destruct the enemy forces, as it was before, but to undermine the morale of the population of the enemy country as a whole to such an extent that it would bring its government to make peace”83 .

It is noteworthy that modern propaganda uses not so much primitive stamps, but complex, thoroughly elaborated strategies. J.S. Nye Jr. emphasizes that primitive “brainwashing” can cause the opposite effect. He writes: “The information perceived as propaganda, can be met not only with disdain, but also become counterproductive, if it undermines the credibility of the country”84 .

A fertile field to handle the public opinion is television. The psychology of a viewer is that he/ she takes someone else’s opinion as his/her own, resulting in the situation that television does not reflect the reality, but mythologically interprets it”85. However, the development of social networks and blogging communities offer in this respect new, not yet fully investigated possibilities.

Technologists of “nonviolent struggle” prepare in advance for the situation that their actions will cause a negative reaction of the authorities. As R.L. Helvey notes, “nonviolent actions against a repressive regime would often meet violence. One can expect beatings, torture, imprisonment and other sanctions (violent, economic and social). However, when the government reacts in such a way, wide popularity of such acts can often be used by the opposition to gain public support for the democratic movement”86. To reduce the effectiveness of repression, the strategists of “nonviolent actions” use the following measures.

Firstly, they seek to win the policemen and other officials over to their side. R.L. Helvey suggests that the policemen should be influenced through their friends and family, bringing to them the idea that the opposition does not consider the policemen to be enemies if they are willing to contribute to the resistance87. It is most difficult to establish contact with the army, because the army units are often located far from the residence of soldiers, and in the army environment, patriotism and conservatism are prevailing. However, the author does not consider this task impossible, citing as an example the refusal of Serbian army to act in defense of Slobodan Milosevic88 . R.L. Helvey does not write directly about the work carried out in the security services, however, as K.D. Chivers notes, the a defection of state security officers to the opposition played the leading role in the victory of the “orange revolution” in the Ukraine89 .

R.L. Helvey considers a particularly important task to be “recruiting of friends and family of the key officials supporting the tyrant to the democratic opposition… The tyrant shall face the problem of preserving the loyalty to him/ her of those who have to arrest, intimidate and subject to cruel treatment the members of their own families”90. The work of civil and public officials is considered quite important. They may be useful for the movement, if they simply sabotage the work. Of course, they will bring even greater benefits to the opposition if they present the insider information.

Analyzing the “color revolutions” that took place in a number of the CIS countries, the Russian researcher A. Chadaev expressed an interesting opinion: “A cardboard hero needs a cardboard villain as a pair: and such a villain is always found in the face of the authorities and always turns out to be cardboard”91. The concern is that there is nothing more profitable for the organizers of “nonviolent struggle”, than the opposition threatening in words, but ineffective in practice. It does not matter here, if such behaviour is explained by incompetence and corruption of the law enforcement structure or purposeful work of the “agents of influence”. This is the case when stupidity is not better than cheating.
Another aspect of the anti-repression actions is to raise the morale of the participants of the movement. According to R.L. Helvey, “obedience is mainly a combination of habits, fear and interests. Habits and interests may be changed, and fear can be driven away”92. Speaking about the organization of meetings, he demands: “Have a good plan, make sure that the participants know it, and have leaders who will ensure its implementation... If there is no leader in the front ranks of the demonstration, he/she should explain to the people why he/she was not there and where he/she would be. Leaders shall ... discuss measures that will not let the people feel alone. At public events, such as demonstrations, people need to keep close enough to each other to touch, shake hands and communicate (chant, sing and talk) ...Wearing similar clothing and symbols is a psychological support, which provides a visual association with others, who share the same values and beliefs”93. “Placing posters in front of the protesters and at a height that does not allow the demonstrators to see the ranks of the police, reduces fear”94. Speaking about the importance of the unity of the movement’s participants, R.L. Helvey notes: “Contrary to the patriotic rhetorics... very little brave actions are done out of love for freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Most of the acts of heroism are inspired by loyalty and devotion to the comrades”95.

It should be emphasized that conflicts with the police for current social extremists are not unwanted trouble, but a natural element of the struggle, which they tend to use in accordance with their scenario. Strict, but ill-planned actions of law enforcement bodies may play into the hands of extremists. For example, one of the experts in the organization of “orange revolutions” gives the following advice: “If the demonstration is more likely to end with collisions, place young girls in white blouses in the front ranks. And wait for the police to attack. The effect is guaranteed: after a few strokes there will be a bit of blood on white blouses (or a lot, unfortunately). There will be excellent pictures that will spread on the screens all over the world... And the regime will be discredited”96. It is especially dangerous when at first the police gets susceptible of provocation by committing acts of violence that have the opposite effect, and then, under the impact of the agents of influence or for other reasons, it just ‘plays back’ as mindlessly. A few cycles of this kind can significantly strengthen the positions of extremists97.

A separate section of R.L. Helvey’s work is dedicated to the phenomenon of leadership and training of leaders for strategic nonviolent struggle98. Attention is paid to such qualities as the ability to lead by example, knowledge of people and their problems (“for the leader of the local level, each person must have a name and a face”), as well as knowledge of the enemy, loyalty of the organization of “resistance”, the ability to take responsibility, support the success of other participants (and not to stick out their own role), learn from mistakes, develop useful skills of subordinates, etc. Different leadership styles are considered. The author points out that the importance of the abovementioned qualities may vary depending on the situation, and the choice of a particular leadership style is less important than the competence99.

R.L. Helvey specifically points out: it is necessary to involve religious leaders in the movement. If this is not possible, it is necessary to neutralize their impact100. Herewith, specific attention should be paid to certain events that take place in modern Russia. In January 2012 it was reported that the Patriarch Kirill will not respond to a provocative letter of B.A. Berezovsky, who called him to join the “non-system opposition”101. Thereafter a massive campaign began to discredit the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in the media and in the Internet. The apotheosis was the performance of the feminist group Pussy Riot on February 21 at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, which was actively discussed in the media. What is happening suggests that the campaign is performed in accordance with the logic of strategic nonviolent resistance”102. However, it should be noted that in this case, the “technologists” obtained rather the opposite result, which was confirmed both by processions and other acts held by Orthodox Christians to protest against these actions and the results of public opinion polls103.

Already in 1960s intelligentsia and young people of the “target countries” became an important object of the U.S. psychological war operations. In particular, the programmes were implemented that would allow the United States to rely on the “elite” of the local intelligentsia and future political leaders in Africa104. R.L. Helvey writes: “raw materials for nonviolent struggle are people: organized, trained and skillfully led”105. He also notes: “In nonviolent conflicts, as in war, young people are in the front lines”106. At the same time, he mentions that for youth organizations the discipline is particularly important, their members must follow a strict “code of conduct”107. It is also useful to engage the business community and the working class in nonviolent struggle (especially the workers of the transport and related fields to ensure the transportation of people, goods and services)108.

At the end of 1960s, the Australian psychologist F. Emery studied the specific behaviour of young people at rock festivals (particularly at the famous Woodstock). As the result of long-term research, the researcher came to the conclusion that this activity reminds of swarming bees. The researcher also introduced a special term, “teenage swarm” and determined a relationship between this phenomenon and the so-called “hysteria of revolt”. Moreover, he concluded that such a “swarm” can be effectively managed for political purposes, including the organization of coups d’état109.

A few decades later, the results of F. Emery’s research complemented by achievements in the field of communications were used by the organizers of the so-called colour revolutions. Using social networks and mobile communications (in particular, for sending messages) the experienced coordinators manage revolutionary masses, guiding them in the right direction, quickly correcting the behaviour of different groups and thereby ensuring coherence of actions110. Anti-globalists use modern methods of rapid alert during their actions. These technologies are also the basis of the recently appeared practice of flash mobs: spontaneous and usually meaningless mass performances. Reports of the time, place and scenarios of the latter are transmitted by their participants through the Internet or mobile phones111.
A. Butkevicius, a Lithuanian student of G. Sharp, had repeatedly admitted that the victims of the events that occurred in January 1991 in Vilnius, were originally planned to pay “little blood” for the freedom of Lithuania112. V. Landsbergis in his interview with the British journalist D. Price-Jones also explicitly stated that blood and heroes were needed for the freedom113.

The activities to consolidate the activists are accompanied by the efforts to alienate the supporters of the current government. R.L. Helvey emphasizes: “Keep in mind that the pressure of one circle works both ways, and can be used as a useful tool for changing behaviour patterns”114. As researchers note, “average people are imposed the fear of not being “with us”... The number of those “being with us” is growing like a snowball. A group of people, which has recently been a marginal sect of the opposition, rapidly acquires a mass of followers and supporters”115. Herewith, the process of discrediting and defamation of the supporters of the integrity of the state goes on, declaring them “the servants of the regime”. A real psychological war takes place here. Describing how the latter was carried out in the late 1980s in the Baltic, the writer V. Petkevicius noted: Stalinism in Lithuania was fought using Beria methods116.

G. Sharp himself admits: “Sometimes violence is inevitably limited. Anger and hatred for the regime may cause an explosion. Moreover, some groups may continue acts of violence, recognizing the importance of nonviolent struggle. In such cases, there is no need to give up political disobedience, but it is necessary to separate violent and nonviolent acts as much as possible”117. The student of G. Sharp A. Butkevicius expressly stated that he supported “combined resistance”, which combined nonviolent and armed components118.
If G. Sharp just slightly mentions international assistance that could be provided to the democratic movements in case of “strong internal resistance” (thus the author supposes that “countries abroad” are ready to help them, but they have to prove their competency), R.L. Helvey directly writes: international intervention can weaken the regime and accelerate the collapse of the latter. However, a clear strategic plan is required, the implementation of which will not allow local authorities to use the “siege mentality” to unite the citizens. The main role here is given to propaganda aimed at undermining the sources of power: it must be applied before the invasion begins119.

The outcome of the tense political struggle is always predictable only in part. Not everything is defined by resources, a lot depends on the will and determination of the opposing parties. As noted by G. Sharp, “the success of nonviolent actions depends on a number of factors”. These include “the amount and the proportion of noncooperating and resisting people, the courage of the latter under the threat of repressions, maintaining the nonviolent discipline, and sometimes the pressure of the third parties. In some situations it is also important how open is the disobedience; rejection to cooperate undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the authorities, their eligibility to apply sanctions and penalties. It is also extremely important how active the existing or newly emerging institutions of the society become in the nonviolent struggle”120.

The strategists of nonviolent struggle have high hopes for the phenomenon, they call “political jiu-jitsu”. It is a special process, “which can be carried out in the course of nonviolent struggle, changing the balance of powers. The negative reactions to violent repressions of the nonviolently resisting citizens are politically turned against the opponents, weakening their positions of power and strengthening the nonviolent resistance. This may work only when violence meets nonviolent disobedience, and not violence and rejection to fight”. In this case, repressions of the opponents appear in the worst light, boomeranging the public opinion against them in the country and abroad121.

Frankness with which R.L. Helvey writes about how the potential leaders of democratic movements can find support abroad is quite noteworthy. He recommends to hold negotiations with foreign governments “in terms of common interests”. As one of the arguments that can convince these people to support the nonviolent struggle, he names the promise to provide airspace for military flights, to ensure cooperation of intelligence services as soon as a favorable investment climate is set, and , “perhaps even provide space for the disposal of external forces, if mutual interests would be violated”122. According to the author, a convenient platform to announce the requirements of “nonviolent movements” is the hearings of the U.S. Congress123.

Since interaction with governments requires special skills and capabilities, R.L. Helvey also recommends to cooperate with nongovernmental organizations. At the same time, however, it should be understood that the support of nonviolent struggle is not “charity, where no one expects return. Those receiving help should consider the grant support provided as a contract. The contract means that in return the recipient must report to the donor about the number of members, establishment of the system of notification, courses, production and distribution of printed materials or other indicators that are important to achieve the objectives of the grant ... In the field of non-governmental organizations, there are much more requests for support than resources available”124.

In order to induce people to commit acts irrational and destructive in their nature, “eversors” can pass knowingly false information through the mass media and the Internet, start panic rumors. In some cases, the purpose of the latter may be a “withdrawal” of psychological barriers to the use of violence. Studies of ethnographers and folklorists show that “the tradition only authorizes violence that is performed in the interest and on the signal from the procreative sphere”125, i.e., for the protection of women and children. It is logical to assume that the most cynical manipulators will distribute chilling news of violence against the most vulnerable. Only few people may critically evaluate such reports in the periods of high emotional intensity.

In December 1989, the reporters of the world media reported about the massacre, which allegedly took place in the Romanian city of Timisoara. They reported about thousands of victims. The apotheosis was the message that the Ceausescu cutthroats allegedly broke into the maternity hospital and ripped the bellies of the pregnant women open. The reports had photos attached. After the power went to the opposition, and the Ceausescu were shot, it turned out that the women died during childbirth, and the cuts appeared as the result of dissection. Thus, a monstrous pretence was organized with an understandable political orientation126.

The incident in Timisoara was not the only one of its kind. V.N. Shved refers to the testimony of the citizens in the files of the case incited in connection with the events at the Vilnius television tower in January 1991. The citizens claimed to have seen dead bodies lying on the ground before the arrival of Soviet troops127. M. Collon gives evidence of such manipulation in the course of Yugoslavia events128.

Thinking about the “prospects” of such manipulations, it should be noted that the extremely favorable conditions for them are created by the Internet network, especially by social networks and blogging communities. Sensational reports emanating from the alleged “eyewitnesses” are distributed with extreme ease. Of course, nothing contributes better to the spread of false information and beginning of panic rumors as the atmosphere of uncertainty and mistrust of the population for the official sources of information and the inefficiency of state information policy129.

Speaking of the technology aimed at destabilizing social and political situation, it is important to mention the paradigm of modern strategic studies known as the chaos theory. As S. Mann points out, the latter is used for the study of dynamical systems, which include a variety of components –chaotic at the first glance, but easily organized by insignificant but verified effects130. It should be noted that the issues of the system behaviour under turbulent conditions and the emergence of order out of chaos have long attracted the attention of researchers. It was J. Schumpeter who said that “creative destruction” was often necessary to move forward131. However, the concept of S. Mann mainly deals with the instrumental use of the technology of chaos to undermine unfriendly regimes. One of the key concepts of his theory is “self-organized criticality”, i.e. the situation when even minor events can trigger a chain reaction that leads to a disaster132.

A. Toffler writes, “when the environment becomes too tumultuous, the systems cease to be linear, thus providing ample opportunities for small groups ... A chance, help from outside and the snowball effect (created with the active participation of the media –Author’s note): these are the factors that help to explain why throughout the history of mass democracy, extremist cults, revolutionary cliques and underground organizations ascended during the tumultuous confusion, why a previously insignificant small group may suddenly become decisive”133. An even more favorable situation for the radicals is formed in the conditions of “mosaic democracy”, with no unified majority134.

G. Sharp offers certain steps for transition after the overthrow of the dictatorship to stable functioning democracy135, R.L. Helvey advises not to let criticism of the current government flow in the anarchist direction, not to abuse the incitement of such strong emotions as hatred and prejudice. Though he mentions that if the latter “are on the surface, they should be directed against the system, which gives rise to tyranny and not against the groups that benefit from it. And by limiting the concept of “enemy” to one person or a group at the height of power, destructive passions will contribute to death, exile or imprisonment of the leader”136.

Despite all good intentions, in practice, the victory of nonviolent revolutions often plunges the country where it occurred into chaos. As the Russian-Ukrainian team of researchers notes, “assuming the conquest of power by the crowd, which relies on external support, the country is trapped. After all, the crowd, as opposed to the elite set up during the revolution, is dissipated, and the power gets directly related to the hegemon, which has supported it137. Assessing the events of the Arab Spring, the analysts of the international fund Experimental Creative Center came to the conclusion that “the general plan, under which these “revolutions” have been initiated is the dismantling of Modernity. Or, in other words, the globalization of nondevelopment” 138. After describing the technology of strategic nonviolent struggle, it is logical to give characteristics to its essence, i.e. the “inner content of the subject, which is expressed in the unity of diverse and contradictory forms of its existence”139. In connection herewith, it is relevant to recall that social philosophy identifies three types of the integrity of the state: structural, functional, and genetic. The first one is defined by a unified structure of relations between the elements or parts of a whole, the second one, by correlation of various functions performed by various elements of the system and the third one, by the presence of a generating element or structure140.

Application of the analyzed technology impacts, first of all, the functional aspect of the integrity of the state. If the “rules of the game” traditionally adopted in the latter prescribe to treat the police or civil servants only as “screws” of the state apparatus that performs certain responsibilities, then G. Sharp and R.L. Helvey offer to engage these people into the network of public relations organized for the benefit of the opposition. Formally retaining their positions, the officials actually become the elements of the socio-cultural system.
An important place is given also to undermining of the genetic integrity of the state, which, as pointed out by B.S. Ebzeev and his co-authors, is a traditional priority for our country141. According to the fair remark of V.A. Lisichkin, “the historical past of the people is the basis of an integrated community”. There is a number of the humanitarian technologies aimed at the destruction of this foundation. Among them the substitution of the present problems by the references to the biasedly interpreted historical facts, projection of modern conflicts on the wars of the past (to characterize this method the expression «wars of memory” is used) and purposeful “debunking” of heroes and famous people, the pride of the nation. To occupy the places of the latter alternative figures may be nominated, but the practice of total defamation of the nation’s history is also known142. A. Tsuladze states, “as a result of “exposure” of the old myths Russia remained without history. There is a set of different myths about Russia’s past, from the left to the right, but there is no national, i.e. generally accepted myth”143. As a result, as V. Polosin correctly observes, “along with the history the outlines of the whole mythological historical space of the nation are lost, and the historical events become a chain of random facts pertaining not to one, but different historical subjects... The people is like a child looking for his/her mother and father in the crowd, whose faces he/she has never seen”144. In the European mass media it has been repeatedly announced that the result of the Ukrainian orange revolution was to be the emergence of the government with a new, not the post-Soviet source of legitimacy. They also discussed the birth of the “new nation”145.
From the destruction of functional and genetic integrity there is a direct way to undermine the structural integrity of the state, the most important component of which is the territorial integrity146. If the system of the state turned into a simple set of people formally occupying certain positions, and actually acting in antistate interests, if historical ideas motivating self-sacrifice are destroyed, it is not difficult to eliminate the integrity of the territory, which is an inherent feature of the state147.

Based on the above, we can conclude that strategic nonviolent struggle is a complex humanitarian technology aimed at ensuring the change of state power by weakening the structural, functional and genetic integrity of the state mainly by conviction and psychological manipulations. A complete answer to this challenge includes not only opposition to destructive entities, but also strengthening of the integrity of the state by uniting three abovementioned types of the latter.

1 Cited by P. Schweizer. The Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union / Peter Schweizer; [trans. from
Polish by L. Philimonova] –Moscow: Eksmo: Algoritm, 2010, P. 27.
2 In his other work, the author of this article offers a terminology system according to which “Technology is a system of
methods of some kind of activity aimed to achieve a certain result more efficiently. The technologies aimed to produce a
target effect on social structures and social processes are called social. The humanitarian technologies are interpreted as
a type of social technologies based on predominating use of soft methods such as persuasion and psychological manipulation
instead of enforcement, orders or rewards”. Klachkov P.V. Ponyatie gumanitarnykh tekhnologii v sisteme sotsialnofilosofskikh
kategorii [The Concept of the Humanitarian Technologies in the System of Social and Philosophical Categories]
// Sovremennye problemy nauki i obrazovaniya [Modern Problems of Science and Education]– 2012. –No. 3; available
at: (date of submission: 19.06.2012).
3 Sharp G. Gandhi as a Political Strategist. –Boston: Extending Horizons Books: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1979.
4 Cit. by: Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 96.
5 See: Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 87-88.
6 See: Gorev A.V. Op. cit. P. 106.
7 Ibid. P. 158.
8 Cit. by: Ibid. P. 36.
9 Ibid. P. 189.
10 Ibid. P. 202.
11 Ibid. P. 196.
12 Sukharev A. Mir bez nasiliya Makhatmy Gandi [The World Without Violence of Mahatma Gandhi] // available at http://
13 Cited by: Gorev A.V. Op. cit. P. 325.
14 As A.I. Fet notes that appearance of modern capitalism was connected with the coincidence of three historical facts in
time. Along with the technical progress there was an excess of poor people in European countries and the demand for
industrial goods from the metropoly in colonies. See: Fet A.I. Instinkt i sotsial’noe povedenie [Instinct and Social Behaviour]
–Novosibirsk: Publishing House “Sova”, 2005. –P. 361. Therefore, rejection to buy British goods stroke one of the
supports of the colonial capitalist system.
15 Cited by: Gorev A.V. Op. cit. P. 115.
16 See: Gorev A.V. Op. cit. PP. 163, 308.
17 Ibid. Pp. 158-159.
18 As M.K. Gandhi argued himself, “I want the wind of the cultures of different countries to blow free in front of my house.
But I don’t want it to knock me down. Cited by: Gorev A.V. Specified Works. P. 113.
19 See: Rakesh Raman Jha. Sociology of Peace and Nonviolence. –New Delhi: Northern book centre, 2003. –P. 6 // http:// . In Chechnya
there is a stable point of view that the formation of L.V. Tolstoy’s theory of non-violence was influenced by the views
of the Sufi sheikh K.-Kh. –ishiev. See: Delimkhanov A. Kunta-Khadzhi Kishiev byl velikim gumanistom i religioznym
deyatelem [Kunta-Hadji Kishiev Was a Great Humanist and Religious Figure]// available at
20 See: Gorev A.V. Op. cit. P. 142.
21 See: Gorev A.V. Op. cit. P. 74.
22 See: Gorev A.V. Op. cit. P. 7.
23 See: Sharp G. Gandhi as a Political Strategist. P. 280.
24 See: Ibid. P. 275, passim.
25 Cit. by: Ibid. P. 279.
26 Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 12.
27 See: Khrustalev M.A. Metodologiya prikladnogo politicheskogo analiza:uchebnoe posobie [Methodology of Applied
Political Analysis: Course Materials] –Moscow: Prospekt, 2011. –pp. 11-12. N. Chomsky outlines the support of a number
of violent and corrupted dictators by the United States: Mobutu, Trujillo, Somoza, Marcos, Duvalier, Suharto, etc. See:
Chomsky N. Deterring Democracy. –NY: Hill and Wang. A division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1992. –P. 14.
28 Meisan T. Institut Alberta Einshteina: otkaz ot primeneniya nasil’stvennykh metodov v versii TSRU [The Institute of
Albert Einstein: Rejection to Use Violent Methods in the CIA] //
29 Of course, the famous physicist who died in 1955 did not participate in the development of the technologies of G. Sharp.
Nevertheless, the latter used his text as a foreword to his first book published in 1960. See Ibid. Herewith, it should be
mentioned that A. Einstein treated Mahatma Gandhi with great respect. See: Gorev A.V. Op.cit. P. 226.
30 Ibid.
31 See: Sharp G. Ot diktatury k demokratii:strategiya i taktika osvobozhdeniya [From Dictatorship to Democracy: Strategy
and Tactics of Liberation] / Translated from English by N. Kozlovaskaya –Moscow: Novoe Izdatel’stvo, 2005. –P. 8. See
also: Shved V.N. Kak razvalit’ Rossiyu? Litovskii variant [How to Ruin Russia? The Lithuanian Version] / Vladislav Shved.
–Moscow: Algoritm, 2012. –Pp. . 215-230.
32 See: Sharp G. Waging Nonviolent Struggle. 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential / By Gene Sharp with the
collaboration of Joshua Poulson and the assistance of Cristopher A. Miller and Hardy Merriman. –Boston: Extending
Horizons Books: Porter Sargent Publishers, Inc, 2005. P. 280.
33 See: Kuttner R. Gandhi in East Boston // The American Prospect. –2011. –February 17. –
34 See:
35 From the note at the website of the Centre. Cited by: Kara-Murza S.G. Oranzhevaya mina [The Orange Mine] P. 30.
36 See: Sharp G. Ot diktatury k demokratii:strategiya i taktika osvobozhdeniya [From Dictatorship to Democracy: Strategy
and Tactics of Liberation] / Translated from English by N. Kozlovaskaya –Moscow: Novoe Izdatel’stvo, 2005. –P.10.
37 Ibid.
38 Sharp G. Nenasil’stvennaya bor’ba: luchshee sredstvo resheniya ostrykh politicheskikh i etnicheskikh konfliktov? [Nonviolent
Struggle: the Best Way to Solve Acute Political and Ethnic Conflicts?]// Filosofskie nauki [Philosophic Sciences]
–1990. –No.11. –P. 83.
39 Ibid. P. 81.
40 Sharp G. From Dictatorship to Democracy. P. 21-22.
41 See: Gorev A.V. Op.cit. P. 150.
42 Ibid. Pp. 219-221.
43 Ibid. Pp. 302.
44 Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. xi.
45 Ibid. P. 89.
46 Sharp G. From Dictatorship to Democracy. P. 16.
47 Ibid. Pp. 27-28.
48 Moreover, G. Sharp warns about the temptation to deviate from strategic plans by concentrating on insignificant problems
and giving way to spontaneous emotions. See: Sharp G. From Dictatorship to Democracy. P. 58.
49 Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 137.
50 Ibid. P. 50.
51 Ibid. P. 49.
52 Ibid. P. 53.
53 Cited by: Iliin V.V., Panarin A.S. Op.cit. P. 13.
54 Sharp G. Op.cit. P. 54.
55 Ibid. P. 38.
56 Cited by: Mamut L.S. Op. cit. P. 135.
57 Sharp G. From Dictatorship to Democracy. P. 67.
58 Ibid. P. 68.
59 See:Майские_события_во_Франции_1968_года
60 Sharp G. Op.cit. P. 60.
61 Ibid. P. 31.
62 Ibid. P. 32.
63 Toffler E. Op.cit. P. 281.
64 See: Shved V.N. Op.cit. P. 81.
65 See: Sharp G. Op.cit. P. 50.
66 Kholmogorov E.S. Problema 2005 // Spetsnaz Rossii [Problem 2005 // Special Forces of Russia] –2005. –No. 1 (100).
67 Toffler E. Metamorfozy vlasti: Znanie, bogatstvo i sila na poroge XXI veka [Metamorphoses of the Power: Knowledge,
Wealth and Power on the Brink of the 21st Century] (translated from English) / Elvin Toffler –Moscow: AST: AST MOSKVA,
2009. –P. 68 Ibid. P. 18.
69 Iliin V.V., Panarin A.S. Op. cit. P. 18.
70 Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 50.
71 Ibid. P. 137.
72 Ibid. P. 122.
73 Ibid. P. 72.
74 Ibid. P. 121.
75 Ibid. P. 120.
76 Ibid. P. 138.
77 Cited by: Shved V.N. Op. cit. P. 222.
78 See: Zhiveynov N.I. Op.cit. P. 23.
79 Cit. by: Ibid. P. 78.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 See: Ibid. P. 128-132.
83 Cited by: Iz istorii psikhologicheskoi voiny // Problemy voennoi psikhologii: Khrestomatiya [From the History of Psychological
War // Problems of War Psychology: Reader’s Book] / Selchenok K.V.; general edit. Taras A.E. –Mn: Kharvest,
2003, P. 383.
84 See: Nye J.S., Jr. The Future of Power. P. 104.
85 See: Tsuladze A. Op.cit. P. 262.
86 Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 34.
87 See: Ibid. P. 10.
88 See: Ibid. P. 11-12.
89 See: Kara-Murza S.G. The Orange Mine.
90 Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 74.
91 Cited by: Kara-Murza S.G. The Orange Mine.P. 182.
92 Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 60.
93 Ibid. P. 104-105.
94 Ibid. P. 106.
95 Ibid.
96 Cited by: Jover V. Tvortsy revolyutsii [Creators of Revolutions] available at:
php/2011122015868/stat-i/nit-vremeni/2011-12-17-16-40-38.html It is noteworthy, that R.L. Helvey in his work published
a little earlier, wrote about the use of white bandages by demonstrators for the same purposes. See: Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P.
105. One can ascertain that the technologies of nonviolent struggle continuously develop.
97 A.E. Gapich and D.A. Lushnikov are of the same opinion. They note that for the opposition “the regime demonstrating the
absence of internal unity and weakness and not capable of making repressions” is optimal. Nevertheless, unconformity of
positions of its representative and spontaneous actions of the juniors lead to local demonstration of power, which causes its
delegitimization in the eyes of the society. What can be better for the opposition if in the course of a local uncoordinated
act of violence the “revolution heroes” appear.” Gapich A.E., Lushnikov D.A. Op. cit. P. 57.
98 Nye J. determines the leaders as the people who “help the group to create and achieve the aims they share”. (Nye, J.S. Jr.
The Powers to Lead. –NY: Oxford University Press, 2008. –P. 9). In his opinion, leadership is “a power to direct and mobilize
others [to achieve] some purpose” (Ibid. P. 19). The demand for leaders is explained by the fact, that “for the human
group they fulfill the function of creating meaning and aims, strengthening the group identity and unity, maintaining order
and mobilizing collective work” (Ibid. P. 19-20).
99 See: Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 107-115.
100 Ibid. P. 16-17.
101 The Patriarch Kirill Will Not Respond to the Open Letter of Berezovsky // available at
102 See: Maksimenko S., Smirnov A. Pussy Riot: Protracted Performance // available at
103 See: Ibid.
104 See: Zhiveynov N.I. Op. cit. P. 150.
105 Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 93.
106 Ibid. P. 137.
107 See: Ibid. P. 15.
108 Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 17.
109 See: Engdal U.F. Stoletie voiny. Anglo-amerikanskaya neftyanaya politika i Novyi Mirovoi Poryadok [The Centenary of
the War. English-American Oil Policy and New World Order] // available at:
110 See: Sorokin N. “Eksport revolutsii v sovremennom mire. Istoricheskie paralleli, tekhnologii I mery protivodeistviya
[“Export” of Revolution in the Modern World. Historical Parallels, Technologies and Counter-Measures] // available at:
111 As Nye J. writes, “Internet provides easier organization of the protests by free amorphous groups, than by hierarchical
organizations. In the era of Vietnam planning of a protest required weeks and months of pamphlets, posters and telephone
calls and took four years until the number of protesting people grew from 25,000 to one million in 1969. Unlike 800 thousand people in the U.S. and 1.5 million people in Europe cooperated during one weekend in February 2003”. Nye, J.S., Jr.
Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics. P. 28.
112 See: Shved V.N. Op. cit. P. 154.
113 See: Ibid. P. 202-203.
114 Ibid. P. 21.
115 Kara-Murza S.G. The Orange Mine. P. 140.
116 See: Shved V.N. Op. cit. P. 92.
117 Sharp G. From Dictatorship to Democracy. P. 36.
118 See: Shved V.N. Op. cit. P. 229.
119 See: Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 40.
120 Sharp G. Nonviolent Struggle: the Best Way to Solve Acute Political and Ethnic Conflicts? // P. 81.
121 Sharp G. There Are Realistic Alternatives. P. 36.
122 Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 125-126.
123 Ibid. P. 126.
124 Ibid. P. 128.
125 Dym A. [] –Moscow: Kislorod, 2008. –P. 25.
126 Verbin A. The Code of Honour of Liars // available at:
127 See: Shved V.N. Op.cit. Pp. 157, 163.
128 See: Kollon M. Neft’, PR, voina. Global’nyi kontrol’ nad resursami planety. [Oil, PR, War. Global Control Over the Planet
Resources]. Moscow: Krymsky most-9D, 2002. –Pp. 53-79. Here is an eloquent statement of E.P. Puchol, the chief of the
Spanish group of forensic pathologists having worked in Kosovo: “We were told to be ready to make 2,000 dissections and
work till the end of November. We found only 187 bodies buried in individual graves, mainly located in the direction to
Mekka, which confirms observance of religious standards. We did not find any signs of torture on the bodies of the buried,
80% died naturally”. Cited by: Ibid. P. 69-70.
129 For more details about eversor’s technologies of managing rumours see: Gapich A.E., Lushnikov D.A. Op. cit. Pp. 126-
130 See: Mann, Steven R. Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought // Parameters. Autumn 1992. –P. 58.
131 See: Toffler E. Op. cit. P. 109.
132 See: Mann S. Op. cit. P. 60. See also: Arshin K. Adventures of the Theory of “Managed Chaos” // available at http://www.
133 See: Toffler E. Op. cit. Pp. 302-303.
134 See: Ibid. P. 303.
135 See Sharp G. From Dictatorship to Democracy. P. 69-70.
136 Helvey R.L. Op. cit. P. 85.
137 Kara-Murza S.G. Op. cit. P. 129.
138 Politicheskoe tsunami. Analitika sobytii v Severnoi Afrike i na Blizhnem Vostoke [Political Tsunami. Analysis of Events in
the Northern Africa and the Middle East] / Edit. Kurginyan S.E. –Moscow: MOF ETS, 2011. –P. 272.
139 Philosophy Encyclopedic Dictionary. P. 665.
140 See: Ebzeev B.S. Op. cit. Pp. 35-36. According to Goethe the truly integrated is only what comes from the common forming
principle and can be thought of as born from it. See: Vasilenko I.A. Politicheskaya filosofiya [Political Philosophy]
Course Materials –2nd edition, revised –Moscow: INFRA-M, 2009. –P. 281.
141 See: Ebzeev B.S. Op. cit. P. 57.
142 See: Lisichkin V.A. Printsip virusa v psikhologicheskoi voine // Problemy voennoi psikhologii: Khrestomatiya [The Principle
of Virus in the Psychological War // Problems of War Psychology: Reader’s Book] Selchenok K.V.; general edit. Taras
A.E. –Mn: Kharvest, 2003, Pp. 441-443.
143 Tsuladze A. Op. cit. P. 287.
144 Cited by: Ibid.
145 See: Kara-Murza S.G. The Orange Mine. P. 152.
146 See: Ebzeev B.S. Op. cit. Pp.36-37.
147 See: Emtsov G.N. Op. cit. P. 23.

Гуманитарная технология «стратегического ненасильственного сопротивления» (Strategic Nonviolent Struggle)

П.В. Клачков
Экспертно-аналитическое управление
Губернатора Красноярского края
Россия 660009, Красноярск, пр. Мира, 110

Автор рассматривает «стратегическое ненасильственное сопротивление» как комплексную гуманитарную технологию, направленную на обеспечение смены государственной власти путем ослабления структурной, функциональной и генетической целостности государства посредством, главным образом, убеждения и психологических манипуляций. Исследователь приходит к выводу, что полноценный ответ на этот вызов включает не только противодействие деструктивным субъектам, но и укрепление целостности государства в единстве трех названных выше типов последней.

Ключевые слова: гуманитарные технологии, «мягкая сила», стратегическое ненасильственное сопротивление, «цветные революции».