Social Entirety of the State and Social Extremism

Оставлен klachkov Пт, 2012-03-23 00:51

Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities and Social Sciencies. - 2012. - 5(3). - P. 403-422.

Pavel V. Klachkov
Department of Expertise and Analytics
of the Governour of the Krasnoyarsk Territory
110 pr. Mira, Krasnoyarsk, 660009 Russia

Abstract: Based on the idea that the actions taken for both reinforcing and destructing the state entirety generally belong to the same social spheres, the author regards the social entirety of the state and social extremism as interdependent phenomena. The article characterizes both mass and “conspiracy” forms of extremist activity. It considers both ideologemes and typical everyday activity, along with some peculiar symbols, images and clichés that form a specific subculture. It demonstrates the interconnection between modern extremism and radical movements of the past. The researcher proves that the state requires efforts to be made both by the state apparatus and the civil society, including the representatives of traditional affiliations in order to provide the social entirety. Synergetic approach is one of the fundamentals of the research, along with the collegiality concept and the term of so-called “symphonic personality”. The author thoroughly characterizes the factors that cause weakening of the state social entirety and strengthening social extremism. It concerns social injustice, frustration of social expectations, the gap between the interests of the elite and the people, deep contradictions within the ruling class, insufficiency of existing researches, inadequacy of the ideological subsystem, support for the extremists demonstrated by some foreign forces, interethnic and interreligious contradictions, and weakness and inefficiency of the law enforcement system. In the conclusion new aspects of social extremism are outlined: the growth of “professional revolutionary” qualification, the use of the latest humanitarian and information technology achievements (like “hive” technology and the Internet).

Keywords: humanitarian technologies, collective behaviour, mass psychology, ruling class, collegiality, social stratification, social frustration, social entirety, social classes, social extremist, synergetic, subcultures, extremism, hive, smart power, soft power.

Before starting to characterize the problems outlined in the title of the present article, it is necessary to clarify some terminology issued. Terminology polysemanticism is one of the unavoidable troubles of humanitarian sciences. The only way to get rid of it is to reach “terminological convention” (1), which is to agree on the univocal use of this or that word. The author has to clarify their position every time unless the convention is reached. Many researchers equate the terms “public” and “social” with one another. According to the other researchers’ opinion, the first word characterizes only those kinds of activities and relations when people prove themselves as communities, while the second one means not only joint, but also individual activities and relations (2). This way, the second approach emphasizes the biosocial nature of the people and the role of socializing process, the social dependence of thinking and activities of the individuals etc. Considering the fact that these circumstances are not disputed by the majority of the researchers, and the present work is more of special than general character, the advisability of such terminological differentiation is not evident. Moreover, the widely used expression “social hatred” that is directly connected to the present topic, does not refer to any conflicts that arise between individuals. Therefore, the author uses the words “social” and “public” as synonyms, though he is not trying to draw a line under this terminological argument. Nevertheless, the author uses them not to define all the phenomena that are connected to society (unlike some natural phenomena), but only those that directly concern the problem of social stratification.

Division of the society into some constituent parts that take different places in the process of work and consumption, has been described in many ways and explained by a series of theories. V.I. Lenin defined classes as “large groups of people that differ from each other with their place in the historically determined system of social production, with their relation (as stated by the legislation) towards the means of production, to their role in the social labour organization, and, therefore, to their way of receiving their share
of the social wealth and its amount. Classes are groups of people, one of which can adopt the work of another due to the different places they take in the pattern of public economy» (3). Marxists considered the state to be a historically limited tool of class supremacy, building Communism would mean extinction of the state (4).

M. Weber regarded the social structure of the community as a multidimensional system, in which authority and social status play very important roles along with the classes and the property relations that created them (5). In particular, this researcher paid much attention to the genesis and functions of bureaucracy that is initially aimed at rationalizing the state administration (6). Out of this conception, M. Weber claimed that the result of socialist construction will be the dictatorship of bureaucrats (7).

Italian political analyst G. Mosca suggested that there are two classes of people in all the societies, that are the ruling and the ruled classes (8). From the point of view of system approach, the latter are understood as the ruling and the ruled subsystems of the social system that the state is (9).

There are other theories of social stratification as well. As Plato noted, “A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse of simple” (10). Polysemy and contrariety of the modern tendencies explain the interest researchers show towards various conceptual approaches in their aspiration to reach the integrated knowledge.

Speaking about social stratification, it is necessary to point out its difference from dividing the society on ethnic or religious grounds. If an ethnos or a faith-based community that includes people of different social status and occupation are theoretically able to exist independently from other people, as they usually include representatives of various professions, it is different for social classes or strata. Having found itself isolated from the society as a whole, such group would either physically die or divide into, at least, the ruling and the ruled subgroups. However, the interdependence does not withdraw the problem of the optimal system for social relations from the agenda, but, on the opposite, makes it especially topical.

As S.K. Abachiev claims, “On all of the structural levels, the subsystems of a social organism are characterized with comparative autonomy” (11). Along with that, society is a system the elements of which “perform some tasks, solve some problems, represent some necessary parts inside a functioning whole” (12), as B. Malinovsky said. The comparative autonomy of the parts does not exclude the social entirety; on the opposite, it is one of its conditions. It was not accidental that Aristotle, when describing the differences between the family and the state, noted that excessive unification can lead to the destruction of the latter (13).

No politically organized society is perfect. As V.S. Solovyev claimed, the task of the state is not to create paradise on Earth, but not to let it turn into hell (14). P.I. Novgorodtsev said that “Justice is striving for the combination of equality and freedom, and it cannot sacrifice any of them” (15). Historically, the balance of these two elements is mobile, so it cannot be found once and forever. However, “connecting themselves to the absolute elements of the eternal truths, some people and some epochs can approach their certain tasks in the right way” (16).

The supporters of extremist doctrines hold to the opposite opinion. Their demands to radically reconstruct the society on the basis of “truly right theories” are combined with declaring the present regime to be insufficient, based only on physical extortion and manipulation of the public conscience.

Concerning this, the ideas of V.D. Ardashkin become especially interesting, as he pointed at the difference between confrontational and the universal approach to the state and the law. As emphasized by the author, the first one deals with the class and antagonistic element and perverts the whole “state functions and the state apparatus. So, the state is depicted not as a common home, but as a torture chamber” (17). The second one, without denying the diversity of the interests existing in the society and the imperfection of the state apparatus, emphasizes the attention on the universal character of the social institutions. Along with that, their commitment to confrontational approach alone, of course, does not lead to extremism. The determining significance here belongs not to the scientific views, but value ideas. In his fundamental study dedicated to the social ideal as a whole and its more radical socialistic and anarchic versions, P.I. Novgorodtsev traces the struggle between utopianism and realism that runs through the whole pre-revolutionary history of Marxism.

The tactics of Utopian Marxism is to give up the compromises while expecting the revolution (according to “the worse, the better” principle); it’s opposite is the political struggle for gradual improvement of the working class (18). He proved that this contradiction can be concealed, but it is irremovable by its nature.
Another line that does the demarcation between the supporters of radical points of view, is more of methodological character. It can be illustrated on the example of the difference between the points of view of K. Marx who supported creation of mass political parties under the united international leadership, and the national anarchist M. Bakunin who considered the secret revolutionary societies to be more efficient. In the year 1872 at the gathering of the First Internationale the movement of Marx won, and Bakunin lost (19). Nevertheless, the conspirators movement developed later. In the same year of 1872 P.A. Kropotkin became a member of the Yurskiy Federation of the First Internationale that was under strong influence of Bakunin’s ideas. Later, Kropotkin proved the need for carrying out terroristic acts in the following way: “Through the terroristic acts that attract the attention of the society, the new ideas are slowly planted into the heads of people and eventually make it change. In several days, these actions can
be of more propaganda effect than thousands of pamphlets”20.

Involving the wide masses into the revolutionary struggle, the leaders of the radical groups also based their ideas not on the logical argumentation. As G. Le Bon claimed, “In the crowd, all the ideas, feelings, emotions, beliefs gain the same power as infections or some microbes do… The effect of the infection is so strong and powerful that all the private interests disappear” (21). Herewith “in the soul of the crowd it is not the strive for freedom that prevails, but the desire to obey; the crowd is longing to obey
so much that it instinctively obeys the one who declares himself to be its master (22). This author vividly described colossal destructive abilities of the “crowd leaders”, people of action, that aremostly “emotionally disturbed people, deranged, short of madness” (23). The researchers note that the phenomenon of collective behaviour is more typical of urbanized society that is explained by the gap in their social roots, anonymity, large amount of temporary residents and high mobility (24).

One of the first researchers of mass psychology, G. Le Bon, probably, exaggerated the abilities of the “crowd leaders”. As A.I. Yuryev fairly notes, the political phenomena can take different shapes: direct, indirect, accentuated and extreme. Extremalization of the political process puts the leaders of the protesting crowds out in the front row. But if they are not able to comprehend the logic of everything going on around and fix themselves at the next stages of it, their “hour of triumph” does not last long. “Who does not remember how many of them there was, how many remarkable spokesmen died on the scaffold after the revolution, how many levy en masse leaders disappeared in torture chambers long after the victory…?” (25).

American sociologist T.R. Gurr finds the connection between the “discreet” or “mass” way of action chosen by the revolutionaries and the balance of coercive control. “If the dissidents are very weak in comparison with the regime, they can come to the conclusion that while waiting for the increase of their coercive abilities… the best opportunity to reach success is creating secret organizations… On the other hand, if the dissidents possess (or think that they possess) the high level of coercive control in comparison with the regime, there still is an opportunity that they may start a plot: there is no need to declare an internal war, if the power can be reached by making one accurate shot into the weakened regime” (26).

Having disproved the integrity of the state undesirable to them, the extremists must go on to the next step, which is to come up with an alternative configuration presented in two aspects: the integrity of the extremist organization that opposes itself against the whole society, and a project of the social organism that they find optimal (at least, in the most general way). It can include some certain subsystems of the presently existing society, setting, however, a connection between them. The radicals suggest either to crush (and introduce their representatives into other social systems) the other subsystems, or to remove them in a more radical way (by expelling some of the citizens out of the country or even executing them physically (27)).

The extremist ideas about the ideal social structure can sometimes be more of a fantasy. Sometimes it feels bewildering that adult, and mostly educated people can preach such naïve and inconsistent ideas. The research of this phenomenon requires a thorough analysis of an “everyday world” (28) in which the members of the extremist organizations live. For the research not only the ideologemes, but also the social practices by means of which the organization members stand apart from the external reality and unite with each other (29). The role that the manipulative abilities of their leaders, the authority opposition and the collective self-deceptiveness play in creating the extremist world outlook, can be seen only in the context of every certain situation. In one of the previous publication we have already mentioned that the universal way of reaching the integrity of the citizens in a state is domination of the common informational and
political space, that includes their being brought up in the environment of the same language, same ideological priorities, maintaining information exchange between the centre and the periphery etc. (30) Acting in the same sphere, extremists are
striving for re-configuration of this informational political space. Breaking down one idea, they want to create new ones. The most important images that the extremists operate with are the “infernum state”, revolutionary brotherhood and the “uniform wearing pigs” that are opposed to it (31).

Despite the fact that the majority of extremists organizations exist for not a long time, many of them are relying on historical examples, declaring being the heirs of the revolutionaries of the past. The question whether this connection is only declared, is complicated, because the issue also has some deeper aspects, some of the of ethnopsychological character (32). Consequently, researching the social extremism of the past enables us to understand the modern image of this phenomenon better, to come to some certain conclusions about the advantages and disadvantages of the countermeasures taken against it.

Russian social extremism has a rich past. For instance, the history of extremist activity in pre-revolutionary Russia of the XIX century is a rich material for analysis. So, in the year 1849 the participants of secret gathering of M.V. Butashevich-Petrashevskiy were arrested. As the officer of secret police I.P. Liprandi wrote in his report, “The members of the group suggested implementing propaganda that would influence the people’s minds. For this purpose, at their gatherings they spoke about how to raise all the classes of the society against the government, how to arm the peasants against the landlords, the bureaucrats against their bosses, how to benefit out of the fanaticism of the dissenters, how to undermine and destroy the religious beliefs of the people, who to act in the Caucasus, in Siberia, in Baltic provinces, in Finland, Poland, Little Russia, where the minds of people were already influenced by the ideas introduced by Shevchenko
in his books” (33).

In the year 1879, after the split of the “Land and Liberty” (“Zemlya I Volya”) party, the terroristic section of this movement created a revolutionary organization called “People’s Will” (“Narodnaya Volya”), the main objective of which was to push the government towards democratic reforms, and one of the main political struggle methods was terrorism (34). Despite for not being a big extremist organization, it conducted a whole series of terroristic acts. On March 1, 1881, the Emperor Alexander II was assassinated. For instance, one of the activists of “People’s Will” was S.L. Perovskaya, the daughter of the Governor of Saint-Petersburg, who later became a member of the Counsel of the Department of Internal Affairs (35). After the arrest of her commonlaw husband, the party leader A.I. Zhelyabov, she personally drew up the shooters’ dislocation layout and with a wave of her white handkerchief commanded I.I. Grinevitskiy to throw the bomb. “People’s Will” continued its terroristic activity after the trial of the tsar assassins that ended up with the death penalty for five of them. Only the arrests of the 1884 eventually managed to weaken the party. However, in the year 1886 a new organization called “Terroristic Fraction” was formed. One of its leaders and the author of its program was A.I. Ulyanov, the blood brother of V.I. Ulyanov who later called himself Lenin.

One of the members of the Second Internationale was the Party of Socialists- Revolutionaries (“SRs”), the largest and the most powerful non-Marxist socialistic party of Russia at that time. One of its slogans was: “In struggle you take your rights” (36). One of the most secret parts of the SR party was so-called “Combat Organization” (CO) that presented itself for the first time with the terroristic act that it performed in the year 1902. Inside the Party,
the Organization as autonomous, the Central Committee would only issue it an assignment for making one more terroristic act at a certain date. CO had its own budget, treffs, addresses, safe houses, and the Central Committee had no right to interfere into its affairs. After the arrest of G.A. Gershuni in the year 1903, CO was taken the charge of by E.F. Azef, who had offered his service to the Police Department ten years before. Along with preventing some terroristic acts (assassination of the Minister of the Interior I.N. Durnovo and Tsar Nicholas II), getting salary from the Security Deparment that counted up to 1000 roubles per month, E.F. Azef organized more than 30 terroristic acts. For instance, the assassinations of the Minister of the Interior and the director of Imperial Russia’s Police V.K. Plehve, the Commandant of the Imperial Palace of Petersburg D.F. Trepov, Commandant of the Imperial Palace of Moscow, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich.

V.G. Nemirovskiy suggests, that “within the period from 1869 till 1905 the spiritual and ideological basis of the new regime was formed within the framework of the existing one. Revolutionary, anti-State ideology was developing. The acts of the Nihilists and revolutionaries lead to antimonarchist and antireligious air in the Russian society. The social bearers of the new regime were, first of all, the so-called “professional revolutionaries”, the outcasts of
different social groups” (37). According to I.A. Ilyin, “When political oppression gives rise to a protest in the souls of the people and does not let it out,this persecution causes a deeper malady already prepared by the non-figurative opposition, that is ill legal sense of the revolutionary underground. At face value, an underground revolutionary is a person of “heroic nature” that rebels against the political oppression and leads self-sacrificing struggle for freedom and justice. However, the political protest that has become his profession and replaced his legal sense, spoiled his spirit so much that his heroism transformed into sickly contradiction, and his self-sacrifice did not heir the honour of his spirit, for the freedom of which he was obviously fighting” (38).

In the year 1909, in the collective volume called “Vekhi”, an article titled “About Intelligent Youth” by A.V. Izgoev was published. The author of the article came to a contradictory conclusion: “The only one and the logical one, the moral vase of the ideas admitted by our revolutionary youth” was an ideal of “deeply personal, even intimate character”. It is manifested in the longing for death, in the desire to prove both to themselves and to the world around them that they are not afraid of death and are always ready to face it” (39). So, the ideal type is a “professional revolutionary who lives a worrisome combating life for two years and then dies on the scaffold”. The scholar comes to a reasonable conclusion that such deep ideas are incompatible with the self-preservation of the society. So, he calls to refuse this “love for death” and motivate the actions by “the love of life, that is common with the millions of our congeners” (40). The author points out that in the works of the church leaders some “conviction of arrogant people seeking for death” can be found (41). It is also worth mentioning that the text had been written by A.V. Izgoev much earlier than the psychoanalytic society of the world got interested in the “mortido» phenomenon.

Extremist organizations of the past entered the history not only with their programs and terroristic acts. Every organization creates its own subculture, which is a part of public culture that differs from the dominating one (42). In case of the extremist organizations, we speak even not about the subcultures but about the countercultures opposing the dominating one (43). The objectives of creating such counterculture are twofold: it creates and supports both the image of the enemy and solidarity within the group. R.L. Lifton, conducted some psychological interview with the people who had undergone the “thinking reformation” of the Chinese Communists, and found that there is a common state that is typical of them, that can be called “ideological totalism”.
This state is characterized by “personal restraint, self-destructiveness and hostility towards any outsiders” (44). Pathopsychology introduces the “tunnel vision” syndrome, which manifests itself in the person’s being obsessed by one predominant idea and striving for it without noticing anything around (45). The world outlook of the members of such extremist organizations is usually “black and white”, where it is easy to point out the “good” (members of the extremist organizations) people, the invisible “enemies” (“the regime”, law-enforcement authorities, etc.) and ordinary people whom the extremists usually despise (46). Basically, every person defines different social groups as the ones to which they belong (“ingroups”) and the groups of “the others”, “the strangers” (“outgroups”) (47), but extremists abuse the idea by defending their “allies’” actions and accusing the “regime” of all the evil, interpreting its policy in one only possible negative way. In the minds of the extremists, the representative s of the regime are unhumanized, they are seen as though they do not have any human features. M. Trebin speaks of a special “antinomic vision of the society”, in the fundament of which for the extremist communities there is a “destructive
axiosphere” (48).

The subculture manifests itself, first of all, in the language peculiarities. As M. Trebin notices, the members of terroristic organizations speak their own slang that may sound like nonsense to the profanes, while it is a cliché language, a code consisting of symbols and stereotypes of a cliché mythogenesis…Strange neologisms and derivative words, curses and hysterical outbursts, theatrical pathos and demagogical rhetoric are all suitable for creating a fanatical conscience”. The researcher points out the following characteristics of the slang: firstly, it expresses the world outlook of emotionally handicapped and acerbated fanatics, secondly, it is a way of avoiding difficult questions and doubts, thirdly, it helps to identify the group members (49).

Subcultures also reveal themselves in the symbols and typical kinds of behaviour in these or those situations. Very often revolutionary subculture is revived by the next generations of “fighters against the regime”. It is explained by the objective similarity of the psychological types and situations. Moreover, revolutionary subcultures are often reproduced intentionally. As a Soviet dissident, V.I. Novodvorskaya writes that after the first arrest in the year 1969 her behaviour matched “all the best standards of the XIX century (“Revolutionary in Prison”). I remembered all the behaviour rules of the political prisoners of the pre-revolutionary period and I was competing with Vera Figner and Sophia Perovskaya… What happened next was predictable… Alexander II was punished for the evil of tzarism, KGB will be punished for the evil of communism, the rebels will show themselves soon, then the revolution will come and all of you will be trialled in Nuremberg...» (50).

The psychologist E.V. Wolfenstein suggests that “a revolutionary is a person who is trying to get rid of Oedipus complex by means of ambivalence, contributing their personal conflict into the political sphere. For such a phenomenon to take place, two conditions must be in action: there must be a conflict of the person with the personality of the father that is not resolved within the family by the end of their adolescence, and there must be some political context within the framework of which this conflict can bloom” (51). K. Rizler claims that the heart of the revolutionary movements is usually composed of idiots, deviants, inadequate personalities (52). At the same time, T.R. Gurr emphasized that inadequate persons can be found in any society, “however, they are more likely to be moved by the struggle process itself, than by the personalities that develop the conflict” (53).

E. Show outlines the four factors that bring a person to terrorism: early desocialization, narcissistic disorders, conflict situations (with the police, in particular) and the personal connections with the members of terroristic organizations (54). However, psychological experiments carried out by S. Milgrem proved, that even the most common person under the influence of the accepted authority can lose all the moral ideas and go for such violent actions as, for example, a murder. For this reason, the peculiarities of the group behavior of extremist communities usually dominate over the individual psychological features of its members (55). E. Alekseeva suggests that “the figure of the leader determines the level of cohesion and the character of the whole community despite of its size” (56).

There are reasons to speak about two main psychological types of the people involved into extremist activity: “romantics” and “cynics” (57). These revolutionary types have different kinds of motivation: idealistic in the first case and mercenary (often, financial) in the second case. The breeding ground for extremist organizations can be different kinds of marginal environments that are not dangerous by themselves without the organizers. The activity of “cynics” is usually driven by general ideological crisis that is typical for the modern society as a whole and creating the ground for the most exotic and sophisticated ideologies.

The problem of extremism cannot be resolved by the state authorities alone, without the society involved.

Complex counteraction against extremism requires creating a system of differentiated multistage self-defence of the society. The
representatives of some traditional affiliations can play a considerable role, as they help to reduce the tension in the society. So, one of the key moments in the “KrasAir” waitresses’ hunger-strike was the speech of the Archbishop of Krasnoyarsk and Eniseisk, Anthony, who appealed for them to stop the strike (58). It is also fair to have a look at the positive components of the experience of prerevolutionary Russia that show that the traditional affiliations can make a remarkable contribution into the harmony of social and economic life, which is vital for preventing extremism.

According to K.S. Abachiev, back in the Middle Ages “the Church basically acted as the civil society that completed the state” (59). This social role of the Church remained till later periods. Like, for example, on the 12 of October 1882 with the help of the Archpriest of the Church of St. Andrew in Kronshtadt, the House of Labour was open; it was a place where everyone could find a simple job, like making caps or beating hemp and get some healthy nutritious food, little money and a clean bed as a payment for the work. Along with this, a library and some vegetable gardens for providing the House of Labour with food were open. As I.K. Surskiy writes, the House of Labour was “almost a town full of cheerful, sensible activities. The management of the House of Labour consisted of the people who belonged to various strata of society, starting from the highest and finishing with the lowest. There was no discrimination between them. All the people there formed a big family and worked together in harmony. All the people suffered the same need and the same troubles. The management of the House were making a great virtuous deed of charity and education, with no political objectives or profit” (60).

Together with this, the researchers notice that the reforms introduced by Peter I and his successors weakened the efficiency of the Church’s social work when it was put under strict state control.

As S.V. Lurie thinks, excessive dependence of the countryside priests on the government and the landlords, the police liabilities that are delegated to the parish clergy lead to the churchmen’s losing their moral authority. As a result, “during the peasants’ revolts they turned out to be unable to take the position that would prevent the rebels and outrage of the revolting people… in the period of turmoil, the priest was not above the system, but inside it, and he could hardly do anything to return the system into its normal state” (61).

There is a well-known quote from L. Boltzman: “There is nothing more practical than a good theory”. The counteractions against the extremist activity must have a very serious scientific support. There should be some research programs for studying the historical roots, causes, tendencies and certain manifestations of extremism. Launching such programs is a part of the authorities’ responsibility. The research results must be conveyed to the authority organs, including those that are running the social and economic policy of the state and law-enforcement authorities. Along with this, the government must motivate public discussions in which the representatives of the community, media, parliamentary parties, and traditional affiliations would take part. The government must supervise some social programs aimed at preventing extremist moods in the society. Preventive measures must be especially taken care of. As for the law-enforcement measures, the most attention should be given not to the common executives, but to the organizers and the masterminds of
extremist activities.

As S.S. Mitin notices, “the society and the authority are dialectically interconnected and interdependent” (62). In the difficult conditions of the modern world the only thing that can preserve Russia as a state and as a unique civilization and cultural environment is ”cooperation” of the authorities and the society based both on common interests and on the traditional spiritual values. On October 11, 2009, Partriarch Kirill performed a great dedication service of a temple in Sestroretsk city in the honour of Saint Peter and Paul, and preached a sermon in which he said the following: “It is easy for us to ignore the spiritual laws of God that He set into our human nature. The result of the ignoring is always the same: if a person decides to jump from a roof thinking that the law of gravity would not work, he would still die, and it is obvious for everyone; in the same way we die as personalities, we lose the axis of life, the support, we destruct ourselves and hurt our nearest and dearest; the country has been set apart so many times for the same reason, which is ignoring the spiritual laws of God” (63). Realizing the total power of the authorities and the society in struggling against social extremism can be of synergic effect, as a result of which a preventive mechanism would be invented, and the social climate would be more propitious for solving social, economic or other kinds of problems.

Among the landmarks that can aid enforcing the entirety of the state and healing the society, we can name the collegiality doctrine that was developed by Russian philosophers of the beginning of the XX century. As S.L. Frank noted, “Unlike the exterior entirety where the power of the whole regulates and limits the freedom of individual members and where the entirety is realized as exterior order, division of competence, rights and responsibilities, the entirety of collegiality is the free life, the spiritual asset that nurtures and enriches the lives of the individuals” (64). The concept introduced by L.P. Karsavin who suggested that the human kind is not a general term, but a real “symphonic personality” that exists in the entirety of all its manifestations in the cultures, nations, peoples, classes, groups, up to empirically concrete individuality” (65).

Having briefly characterized the social entirety of the state and social extremism that opposes it, we can name a series of factors the strengthening of which does inversely proportional effect on the first and the inversely proportional effect on the second (note that the author does not make an attempt to range these two forces according to their significance, because applicable to different situations it can vary).

1) social injustice. As it has been mentioned above, absolute justice is an ideal that should be strived for. However, it does not mean that there are no criteria for differentiating between a
comparatively just social structure and obviously unfair one. In “Nicomachean Ethics” by Aristotle it says that there are two main kinds of justice. The first one reveals itself in distributing honours, or money, or anything else whatever can be distributed between people who are involved in the society (that is where equal or unequal distribution can occur). Its second kind is manifested in the equalling the exchange object (66). So, the first kind of justice is aimed at acting within the framework of political relationships, and the second one, in economic activity. If, speaking with the words of A. Rand, in economic relations “in order to produce, it is
necessary to have the consent of those who have never produced anything”, and “the money does not flow to those who create the goods but to those who create bonds”, while “those who work
are becoming poorer every day, while bleeders and thieves are getting richer, and the laws do not protect the first from the latter, but protect the latter from the first”, “honesty and justice are equal to suicide, and corruption is blooming” (67), such society cannot be referred to as just. In such a society the people who work on different kinds of production lose their interest in supporting the present order.

Along with this, being a supporter of unlimited capitalism, A. Rand overemphasizes one side of justice in the prejudice of another. Completing the equalling justice with the distributing kind is a necessary condition for self-preservation of the society. The only purpose of business are minimizing expenses and maximizing profit. All the subjects that are not a part of the corporation, are regarded as potential clients, counteragents or competitors. It is obvious that the state apparatus cannot follow such a world outlook, as there is no place for non-affiliated citizens of the state (by the way, this is the reason why mechanic transfer of individual management methods into the public sphere).

By nature, politics is connected with determining the priorities of distributing limited resources. The number of vacancies in the state apparatus is also limited. The budgets are never endless, too. It leads to a violent struggle for the “seats” and the financial flows. If this competition is not regulated by some strict rules that have already set themselves in the social consciousness, it is very unlikely that the country will be ruled by some really useful people implementing some really useful projects. It is especially unlikely in a criminal society. In this case, without the opportunity to realize themselves and to satisfy their interests in the existing state environment, many active members of society can fall on the path of social extremism.

This way, breaking the equalling and distributing justice in the society destructs the social entirety of the state. It is one of the factors that strengthens social extremism.

2) frustration (discontent) of the social expectations. The researchers dealing with the history of political violence, have numerously stated that those are not poor people, used to living in poverty and tyranny, who start the revolts, but the people, who had some hope that never came true. T.R. Gurr formulated the following hypothesis: “The potential of collective violence is considerable changed together with the scope of comparative deprivation”. The latter is defined as “the way the agent perceives of the gap between their value expectations and value opportunities (Italics suggested by the Author – P.K.). Under the first we understand the “amenities and life conditions that people can claim for”, and the latter are the things that they should have in reality under the present circumstances (68). The decreasing deprivation, when the opportunities are limited and the expectations remain the same, is very dangerous. Increasing deprivation when the expectations growth is not supported by the appearance of new resources, is very dangerous
indeed. But the greatest risk is connected to the progressive form of this phenomenon when the expectations are growing, and the opportunities of their satisfaction are decreasing (69). To our mind, the situation is aggravated in the societies of consumerist psychology. In such society there are no ideals in the public consciousness for the authorities to appeal for, explaining the need to tighten the belts.

3) radical gap between the interests of the elite representatives and the common people. According to the note made by A.V. Eliseev, “the elite has to be in a way “antipopular” and remain in the opposition to the majority of the nation” (70). Nevertheless, there is no coincidence that the author highlighted two words in this sentence in bold. Total break between the ruling subsystem
and the ruled subsystem is also a form of social extremism that is expressed by the representatives of the ruling class.

When the gap between the dominants that the elite are following and the determinants of the social development becomes unbearable, the loss of the entirety of the original and longterm interests of all members of society leads to catastrophic consequences. The history of the Time of Troubles gives interesting examples of that. As the historian I.E. Zabelin stated, this period was remarkable for its “total bankruptcy of the government, the bankruptcy of its spiritual power… It was not the people who was rebelling and revolting… It was the mischief of the ruling class” (71).

The researches prove that the difference between the status of the ruling and the ruled has reached great scope in our country, while the system of “social elevators” is not functioning appropriately yet. As N.V. Schedrin claims, “The system of nomenclature privileges and immunities is revived in modern Russia, and it is turning the ruling class into a semi-closed elite social group… We can say that Russia is developing its own caste society, but the caste of untouchables is on the top of our social pyramid” (72).

If we trust Homer, the Trojan hero Sarpedon once told his friend Glaucus: “Why are we always honoured with the best seat and the bowl at the feasts, why are they watching us as though we were the residents of the sky? Why do we own the best land, that gives us grapes and wheat?” To his mind, against this the leaders are supposed to be the first in the fight, for every Lycian could say, “they eat the best food and drink the sweetest wines, but they are the first to fight in the army of Lycians!” (73). Can the representatives of the Russian ruling class say the same about themselves?

Exceeded social stratification that is not caused by their contribution into the commonwealth, the loss of the interests’ integrity are dangerous by themselves. But at the same time, they are advantageous for the social extremists, as they are creating some profitable environment for their activities.

4) deep contradictions inside the ruling class that split its political space. Having found themselves in the “see-saw situation” (74), then leaders of the opposite elite groups often start trying to attract any means and any powers for strengthening themselves. Along with that, sometimes, carried away by instantaneous tactic profits, they lose (or they do not want to see) the long-term consequences of such actions. As the historian S.F. Platonov said, “The beginning.. of the Time of Troubles started in the Moscow palace. There was the struggle between the boyar families for the authority and power, and later, for the throne. The palace conspiracy and the elections struggle were trying to involve the population into the political game. They were appealing to the people in Moscow, calling them to start the revolt or mischief, or to admitting the power of Fyodor or Boris. Later the power of the people in the armed conflict was supported by Boris and the False. The intrigue of the False that was created in the boyar environment, the game managed to profit from the class stratification for the sake of dynasty war” (75).

The modern reality can also give us similar examples. According to G. Jemal, one of the factors of the victory of federal power in Chechnya was the fact that they managed to attract the major
part of the society on their side, including some of the field commanders. This approach that at first seemed quite appropriate, became negative when it got into the contradictory situation inside the Russian elite. As the researcher claims, the legal armed Chechen forces “at first, dealt with the militants inside the Chechen Republic. After that they spread all over the Caucasus and started solving the conflicts in Dagestan and other places. After that, Moscow politicians called the special task force of these super elite subdivisions for solving their problems in the capital. Now their participation in “solving problems in the capital” is an everyday practice (76). It is worth mentioning that the certain level of contradictions is immanently typical for the ruling class, the rivalry of the elite groups is typical for all the organized political societies. However, the examples shown above are the cases when this struggle exceeds the limit compatible with preserving the entirety of the state.

5) the lack of the scientific research and inadequacy of the ideological subsystem of the society. One of the main disadvantages of the Soviet system was the fact that it limited the opportunities of studying and legally critically analysing itself (77). Back in the year 1936, L.D. Trotsky justifiably noted: “Economists, historians, even statisticians, no mentioning journalists, are mostly worried by how not to get involved into the present zigzag-like official course. There is only one way of describing Soviet economy, the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union, which is to cover the front and the back with some banal phrases from the “leader’s” speeches, and claiming that everything is on the right track just as it is supposed to be, or even better. Even though one-hundred per cent conformism can relief you of some everyday troubles, it leads to the worst of the punishments, which is, agenesis”. In the 1970s, A.A. Zinoviev came to the conclusion that nothing does as much for undermining Soviet ideology as the ideological apparatus of the Communist Party (78).

In the days when non-Marxist approaches were forbidden and even Marxism itself was replaced by pseudo-scientific scholastics (79), the ideology lost its connection to the reality. In the end, the reproduction of stamps and clichés of “Scientific Communism” turned into a mere ritual of social conformism that has no real connection to the real problems of the country.

6) the support provided to social extremists by foreign empires (80). Such cases are known both in foreign and Russian history. For instance, as M. Schipanov writes, the recently declassified French diplomatic archives prove that France that was behind the Ottoman Empire during the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774, provided E. Pugachev with organizational and financial support (81). In the cases when this factor is combined with some others, the threats mutually increase the effect of each other.

7) inter-ethnic and inter-affiliation conflicts. Some authors suppose that by stoking controversy between them it is possible to weaken the social discord. “If you do not want to let civil or class war happen, start a national conflict” (82) is a “valuable” recommendation provided by A.N. Sevastyanov. However, we believe that this recommendation is of purely theoretic character. It is based on the suggestion about homogeneity of the social structures of all the ethnic and religious communities. However, in practice, the borders between classes, social strata, ethnic and affiliation groups often match, if not totally, at least partially. It leads to the interclass and interethnic tension not weakening but strengthening each other. This way, the authority has to think twice before following this recommendation.

8) the weakness and inefficiency of the law enforcement system. According to T.R. Gurr, to understand the rebellion and revolt, there are three factors that have to be analysed. The first one is studying the discontent of the people (the author emphasizes that it is “not enough to point at the major economic and social structures… it is necessary to understand how people interpret
the situations they get into”). The second factor is the people’s convictions about whether the risk they go for when undertaking some political actions is feasible, and whether the opportunity of getting the amenities they are longing for is real. The third factor is the balance between the ability of discontent people to take actions, and the ability of the governments to deal with this
discontent (83).

The main criterion for the efficiency of the law enforcement organs is not the readiness to take repressive measures against any kind of discontent. Acting against social extremism is a delicate work, though in some critical situations it does require some strength. One of the main conditions of this activity is the social health of its subjects. Indifference towards the citizens and corruption that are revealed by the law enforcement organs in our everyday life, undermine the trust of the population and aid the undermining works carried out by the extremists and the international forces behind their backs. Moreover, the counteractions performed by the police cannot be efficient as long as its senior ranks keep their criminal surplus profits in the bank accounts located in the states that are standing behind the extremists’ backs.

It is important to mind that for the modern social extremists, conflicts with the police is not a trouble that should be avoided but a normal element of the struggle that they want to carry out according to their scenario. Tough but irresponsible actions of the law enforcement organs can play into the hands of extremists.

For example, one of the specialists of organizing the “Orange Revolutions” gives the following advice: “In the first rows of the action that can end up with a conflict there should be some young girls wearing white blouses. Wait for the police to attack them. The effect is guaranteed: after several blows, the blouses will be a little (or, unfortunately, very much,) stained with blood. It will make perfect shots that will be shown in the news all over the world. The regime will be undermined” (85). The situation when the police gets provoked to do some violent actions that have the opposite effect, and then under the influence of some agents or for other reasons, in the same unreasonable way “steps back”, is especially dangerous. Several cycles of this kind can considerably strengthen the extremists’ positions.

The question about the optimal forms and methods of the law enforcement organs and special forces’ work against extremists requires some additional studies. Nevertheless, it is the right moment to quote the words of the prosecutor general, P.H. Oboluaninov, that he addressed to one of the officials working in the superior police: “Don’t be a spy, always keep your responsibilities saint and blessed. Don’t judge those who speak bad of the government but think what the reason is. Very often people blame those who they love. Those who value the Motherland and the Governor, cannot hold back not to reproach when he sees some faults in the state. Don’t look for conspirators or plots somewhere far away, the revolution always begins near the throne” (86).

In the conclusion of the present article it is right to appeal to the new tendency of developing social extremism that can be described with the term “technologization”. To our mind, this phenomenon has three main aspects.

1) forming the class of professional extremist organizers. The expression “a professional revolutionary” exists for over 100 years, but now it has gained a new meaning. That is how V. Jouver describes the “orangist” political strategists: “They are young, well-educated, and they want not less than to carry out the democratization of the post-communist world. Their mutual language is English, and as a rule, it is very good English. Very often they work at Western institutes and organizations, mostly, American. They can be called “international democratic troops”, their activity is supervised by Washington” (87);

2) active use of approaches that have proved their efficiency in business, management and public relations. As B. Yarabik noted, “Revolution is a market with high competition”. Yarabik graduated from the University of Columbia. The leaders of democratic groups have to go to Washington to “sell themselves” to the funds that
provide the finance. To prepare for this exam, they have to train their ability to speak, prepare the plans and financial tables…” (88);

3) wide application of computer technologies. Let us describe this aspect in a more detailed way.

Answering the question, why in all the societies the ruling class that is the minority in the sense of number, rules the majority, G. Mosca usually said that this minority is well-organized and it can always hold the victory over those individuals that are “not united and that is why they are easily defeated one by one» (89). As W. Buckley noticed, every social system exists due to some organized information exchange (90). Till the present time, the state apparatus had much more opportunities concerning this part. With the appearance of the Internet, the situation changed. According to K.S. Abachiev, “in the conditions of the modern openness of information space… all the countries instantly lose their sovereignty in building up their own culture” (91). Some authoritarian states are trying to censor the Internet. As M. Leonard supposes, the best “success” in that was reached by Saudi Arabia and China (92). Along with that, as the author states, against the World Wide Web even “Chinese protection system” is not that powerful (93). The significance of the Internet is not limited to quick transition of data. Net information technologies are a tool and a special assembly point of the “distributed mind”. It is no coincidence that V.V. Nalimov introduced a new category of social being, the “transpersonality”, which means not being connected to oneself, the one’s Ego, it is escaping out of its limits (94).

There are many scientific publications dedicated to the ethnic extremists’ using the Internet for coordinating the activity of their allies and propaganda of their ideas. As A. Denisova notes, together with the development of the Internet, a so-called “hostility language” (Cyberhate”) started to develop. In the Additional Protocol to the European Convention “On Crimes in the Cyberspace”, Cyberhate is understood as “spreading or proving access to racist or xenophobic materials by means of computer systems” (95). There is no doubt that the resources of the Internet can be in the same way be used for provoking social conflicts. The issue of optimal ways of opposing it is still open. As A. Denisova wrote, “If we apply repressive methods in fighting against cyberhate, the Internet community can behave as water, that, getting frozen in between the rocks, breaks them into pieces” (96).

The Internet provides new opportunities for conspiracy or mass extremism. Till recent time the opportunities of the “crowd leaders” were limited, because the condition for the appeal was physical integrity of the crowd. Modern technologies (both technical and humanitarian) enable them to support some certain states of psychological condition of the crowds in the “remote way”. G Le Bon wrote: “To stop the last omnibus coachers’ strike in Paris it was enough to arrest two of their leaders” (97). In our age of “twitter revolutions” this measure is of no effect. Internet technologies played great role in the Arab Spring. For example, Facebook and Twitter were actively used for organization of mass events in Egypt, Syria etc. (98).

One of the latest manifestation of “computer revolutions” is a so-called “hive” technology. It is a kind of independent intranet that keeps functioning even if the World Wide Web on the territory of the city or the whole country is off. It is a network of small capacity devices that use some certain frequency that is within the permitted limits set for microwave ovens.

According to V. Videman, to connect to “hive” it is enough to have a mobile phone (or a similar device) and a special gadget with a transmitter that works as a radiostation. The transmitter works as an antenna that marks the receiving point. If there are many transmitters in the area, it is the Hive zone where you can connect for free, using your mobile phone. It is better if the transmitters are fixed high (in the top floors of the buildings, on the top of the trees and pillars). This technology also can provide permanent video observation. Destroying the camera does not mean the loss of the coverage which is immediately transmitted to the server. The same concerns the records of the cameras installed, for example, in the helmets of some social event or even in their balloons. The police or anyone else cannot confiscate the records, because they are technically not saved in the device. No tape and no chip. It is impossible even to prove that it has ever existed. Finding out the name of the customer is also impossible. The same system can be used for communication with lawyers, doctors, family of the customer, support and pressure groups. All this is works free of charge. The main thing is the electrical charge of the devices” (99).

In the end of his article V. Videman directly writes that the creators of “hive” used to work on “development of special devices for the American army”. Every soldier was supposed to be equipped with a camera hidden in his helmet, with a headpiece with a microphone, so that he can both receive and transmit the signals… The modern protest organizations must have armies of cyborgs like this.

As V. Videman claims, “the end of the state monopoly for the microwaves is the end of censorship as it is”. For instance, it means that the technical means of fighting against “cybersocial extremism” are not more efficient than the electronic noise generators that were used in the USSR to suppress the radio signals of the Western radio stations.

As it is obvious out of everything that has been said above, preserving the social entirety of the state in these new conditions requires new conceptual approaches and well-coordinated attempts of the state apparatus and the civil society. Deep scientific researchers aimed at studying the social well-being of the citizens and the moods of the society are also very necessary.

Notes:

1 Свинцов В.И. [V.I. Svintsov] Логика. – М.: Высш. шк., 1987. – P. 172.
2 See.: Шелике В. [V. Shelike] Исходные основания материалистического понимания истории (По работам К.Маркса
и Ф.Энгелса 1844-46 гг. ). – Фрунзе: ”Илим”, 1991. // Internet: http://www.wtschaelike.ru/?page_id=37
3 Ленин В.И. [V.I. Lenin] Полн. собр. соч. – 5-е изд. – М., 1958-65. – Т. 39. – P. 15.
4 In the year 1852 in his letter to J. Weydemeyer, K. Marx wrote: “as far as I am concerned, the merit of discovering classes
in the modern society or the merit of discovering their being in struggle against each other, do not belong to me. Long
before me, bourgeois historians described the historical development of this struggle between the classes, and bourgeois
economists outlined the economic anatomy of the classes. My only merit was to prove the following: 1) the existence of the
classes is only connected to some certain historical phases of industry development; 2) the class struggle inevitably leads
to the dictatorship of the proletariat; 3) the dictatorship itself is nothing but a transition phase towards eliminating all the
classes, and, therefore, to the existence of a society without classes…”
5 Современная западная социология [Modern Western Sociology]: Словарь. – М.: Политиздат, 1990. – P. 332.
6 See.: Ibid. P. 46.
7 See.: Философский энциклопедический словарь [Philosophic Encyclopedia ]. – М.: Советская энциклопедия,
1983. – P. 75.
8 E.g. see: Дробышевский С.А. [S.A. Drobyshevskiy] История политических и правовых учений: основные классиче-
ские идеи: учеб. пособие. – 2-е изд., доп. – М.: Норма, 2007. – P. 400.
9 There are two main meanings of the word “state”. The tradition that goes back to Aristotle, Cicero and Thomas Aquinas
that means a territorial and political entity. A more narrow interpretation equals it to the apparatus (the mechanism) of
the state government. The narrow interpretation emphasizes the fact that the interests of the state apparatus and the civil
society do not necessarily merge. The wide interpretation demonstrated the role of the state as of a body organizing distribution
and cooperation of labour and other kinds of people’s activities within certain territory. The author of the present
article prefers holding on to the second interpretation.
10 Платон. [Plato] Политик // Internet: http://www.gumer.info/bogoslov_Buks/Philos/Platon/polit.php
11 Абачиев С.К. [S.K. Abachiev] Социальная философия: учеб. пособие / С.К. Абачиев. – Ростов н/Д : Феникс, 2012. –
P. 22.
12 Малиновский Б. [B. Malinovskiy] Научная теория культуры. – М.: ОГИ, 2005
13 «By its nature, state is a kind of plurality. If it is striving for singularity, the state is transforming into a family, and the
family turns into an individual. Everyone agrees that a family is more integrated than a state, and one person is more integrated
into himself than a family. This way, if someone had the opportunity to do it, it would not be worth it because this
act would destroy the state”. Аристотель [Aristotle]. Сочинения: В 4-х т. Т. 4 / Пер. с древнегреч.; Общ. Ред. А.И. До-
ватура. – М.: Мысль, 1983. – P. 404.
14 E.g., see: Абачиев С.К. [S.K. Abachiev] Указ. соч. S. 222.
15 Новгородцев П.И. [P.I. Novgorodtsev] Об общественном идеале // Вопросы философии, 1991. – P. 311.
16 Ibid. P. 511.
17 Ардашкин В.Д. [V.D. Ardashkin] Государство и право: от классового подхода к общецивилизационному // Теория
государства и права: Сб. статей/ Краснояр. гос. ун-т; Отв. ред. В.Д. Ардашкин. – 2-е изд. – Красноярск, 1999. –
P. 29.
18 See: Новгородцев П.И. [P.I. Novgorodtsev] Указ. соч. P. 253, 266, 361 and further.
19 E.g., see: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бакунин
20 Quoted on: Гарр Т.Р. [T.R. Gurr] Почему люди бунтуют. – СПб: Питер, 2005. – P. 279.
21 Quoted on: Контроль сознания и методы подавления личности: Хрестоматия. – / Сост. К.В. Сельченок [K.V. Selchenok].
– Мн.: Харвест, 2004. – P. 15-17. The History of Ancient Rus’ knows a bright example of mass madness that was
inspired by the “crowd leaders” who besides the ability to manipulate the crown, had some hypnotic talent as well. “In the
year 1070 on the land of Rostov two Maguses from Yaroslavl appeared, they were moving from one village to another revealing those who had more wealth, also pointing out at the best, the richest women. One of them had some wheat, another
had some honey, the third had some fish and the fourth had some furs. At that time the whole Northern land was suffering
of hunger. The Maguses leaded the people, and the people brought the rich women to them, and the Maguses cut the skin
on the women’s shoulders and took out the wheat and the honey and the fish, and the people were scared and they ran to
the granaries and the barns and the sheds of the women, opened them and ate their food, and brought it to their families.
Along the Volga and the Sheksna rivers, up to the Beloozero the Maguses walked, and they leaded three hundred people
with them”. Каргалов В.В., Сахаров А.Н. [V.V. Kargalov, A.N. Sakharov] Полководцы Древней Руси. – М.: Молодая
гвардия, 1985. – P. 291.
22 Quoted on: Ibid. P. 11.
23 Ibid. P. 8.
24 See: Ibid. P. 237.
25 Юрьев А.И. [A.I. Yuryev] Введение в политическую психологию. – СПб.: Издательство С.-Петербургского ун-та,
1992. – P. 22. In the memoirs by P.N. Krasnov, the fail of A.F. Kerenskiy at his speech in the end of October 1992 was
vividly described. It happened in Ostrov city, in front of demoralized soldiers who he was trying to persuade to go and
attack Petrograd. The spokesman techniques and slogans that once brought him success turned out to be useless at the
new stage of revolutionary process. See: Краснов П.Н. [P.N. Krasnov] На внутреннем фронте; В донской станице при
большевиках; Всевеликое войско Донское. – М.: Айрис-пресс, 2003. – P. 156.
26 Гарр Т.Р. [T.R. Gurr] Указ. соч. P. 308-309.
27 Some ethnic terrorists of modern Russia suggest a special way of solving this issue, which is to cut the territory of the
state.
28 According to the definition formulated by L.E. Motorina, “the everyday world is a system of life practices, i.e. habitual
lifestyles of individuals within a group or the society as a whole”. Моторина Л.Е. [L.E. Motorina] Философская антро-
пология: Учебник для вузов. – М.: Академический Проект, 2009. – P. 91.
29 As witnessed by the experience got in a series of extremist organizations, it can also include sexual group practices that
are imposed even to those members who do not have inclinations of this kind.
30 Клачков П.В. [P.V. Klachkov] Движение. – Красноярск, 2009. – P. 98.
31 According to the quotation of W. Meinhof, “A creature in the uniform is not a human being, it is a pig, and it should be
treated in the corresponding way. That means that it should not be spoken to; it is impossible to speak to it. The only
thing you can do with it is to shoot it”. Quoted on: Сумленный С. [S. Sumlenniy] Их борьба // Internet: http://expert.ru/
expert/2007/16/ih_borba/
32 There is an interesting opinion of one Internet user who claimed that the “Baader-Meinhof gang” phenomenon had
much more relation with the “specific moral maximalism and radical idealism” typical for German culture, than
to the left slogans and symbolic of this group. See: Очень Немецкий терроризм (нечто вроде рецензии) : Internet
// http://community.livejournal.com/_raf_/15392.html I am not suggesting that some cultures are characterized
with aggression. The anthropologists have come to conclusion that in every society there is not one, but several
personality types that are functionally interconnected with each other. See: Лурье С.В. [S.V. Lurie] Историческая
этнология: Учебное пособие для вузов. – М.: Академический проект: Гаудеамус, 2004. – P. 84. At the same
time, the specificity of ethnic constants and ethnic world outlook determine the peculiarities of the social role, including
deviant ones.
33 E.g., see: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Петрашевцы
34 An extract from Andrei Ivanovich Zhelyabov’s speech that he made on the trial of the case of March 1, 1881: “The situation
demanded that social-revolutionary party including me, as I am totally convinced, had to put a part of its power to the
political struggle. There was a practical way of doing it, which is the way of violent revolt by means of plot, that required
organizing the revolutionary powers in the widest sense of this word” //Internet: http://vivovoco.rsl.ru/VV/PAPERS/HISTORY/
REVOL/SPEECH.HTM
35 As M. Trebin notes, among the leaders of terroristic groups the share of women was very high. D. Schwartz emphasized
that women (especially educated ones) are more inclined to active substraction and are ready to violent changes.
It is also connected with the emotionality of women, their tendency to exaltation and affective states. See: Терроризм
как деструктивный модус бытия // Психология террористов и серийных убийц: Хрестоматия. – Мн: Харвест,
2004. – P. 242.
36 As Albert Camus once noted, “The people and actions that live without faith, usually do not trust anything but pure action”.
Quoted on: Требин М. [M. Trebin] Терроризм как деструктивный модус бытия // Психология террористов и
серийных убийц: Хрестоматия. – Мн: Харвест, 2004. – P. 247.
37 Немировский В.Г. [V.G. Nemirovskiy] Тайные общества и заговорщики. – СПб: Питер, 2007. – P. 159.
38 Ильин И.А. [I.A. Ilyin] О сущности правосознания // Internet: http://ru.philosophy.kiev.ua/library/il/02/01.html
39 Изгоев А.В. [A.V. Izgoev] Об интеллигентной молодежи // Вехи. Сборник статей о русской интеллигенции. Из
глубины. Сборник статей о русской революции. – М.: «Издательство «Правда», 1991. – P. 114.
40 Ibid. P. 116.
41 Ibid. P. 117.
42 According to the definition suggested by S.S. Frolov, “Subculture is an integrity of cultural samples, interconnected with
the dominating culture and at the same time different from it”. See: Фролов С.С. [S.S. Frolov] Социология: учебник для
вузов. – 4-е изд., стереотипное. – М.: Гардарики, 2008. – P. 333.
43 According to the definition suggested by S.S. Frolov, “Counterculture is an integrity of cultural samples that are opposite
to the samples of the dominating culture challenging it”. See: Фролов С.С. [S.S. Frolov] Указ. соч. P. 329.
44 Quote on: Гарр Т.Р. [T.R. Gurr] Указ. соч. P. 266.
45 Ольшанский Д.В. [D.V. Olshanskiy] Психология терроризма // Психология террористов и серийных убийц: Хресто-
матия. – Мн: Харвест, 2004. – P. 147.
46 «Total indifference of the people to the NBP’s (National Bolshevik Party that is forbidden nowadays – P.K.) struggle is
a big frustration for the natsbols. They scornfully call everyone who live common life (go to work, bring up their children)
“vegetables”. A vegetable is the “foolish penguin that cower in the crevices of rocks”, apolitical cattle”. См.: Ско-
бейда У. [U. Skobeyda] Как я была нацболом // «Комсомольская правда». 17.07. 2002. Интернет: http://www.kp.ru/
daily/22591/18951/
47 Фролов С.С. [S.S. Frolov] Социология: учебник для вузов. – 4-е изд., стереотипное. – М.: Гардарики, 2008. – P.
181.
48 Требин М. [M. Trebin] Терроризм как деструктивный модус бытия // Психология террористов и серийных убийц:
Хрестоматия. – Мн: Харвест, 2004. – P. 231.
49 Требин М. [M. Trebin] Указ. соч. P. 250-252.
50 Новодворская В.И. [V.I. Novodvorskaya] По ту сторону отчаяния // Internet: http://www.lib.ru/MEMUARY/
NOWODWORSKAYA/novodvorskaja.txt
51 Quote on: Гарр Т.Р. [T.R. Gurr] Почему люди бунтуют. – СПб: Питер, 2005. – P. 224.
52 Quote on: Ibid.
53 Гарр Т.Р. [T.R. Gurr] Указ. соч. P. 69.
54 Лукабо Р., Фукуа Х., Кенджеми Д., Ковальски К. [R. Lukabo, H. Fukois, D. Kengemy, K, Kovalsky]
Терроризм:психологические и политические аспекты // Психология террористов и серийных убийц: Хрестома-
тия. – Мн: Харвест, 2004. – P. 64.
55 See: Алексеева Е. [E. Alekseeva] Террористами не рождаются, ими становятся // Психология террористов и серий-
ных убийц: Хрестоматия. – Мн: Харвест, 2004. – P. 226-227.
56 Ibid. P. 228.
57 In the science there are other points of view as well. V. Vityuk classifies the members of terrorist organizations into idealists
(“seekers of the truth”), condottieres (“seekers of risk”) and castaways (“seekers of the sense of life”). It looks like
in the classification of V. Vityuk cynics were left outside. The English researcher D. Teckro classifies terrorists into the
classes of leaders, executers and realists depending on their role characteristics. See: Требин М. [M. Trebin] Указ. соч. P.
239.
58 Обращение архиепископа Антония способствовало прекращению голодовки красноярских стюардесс // Internet:
http://minds.by/news/20090604_00-53-36.html
59 Абачиев С.К. [S.K. Abachiev] Указ. соч. P. 290.
60 Сурский И.К. [I.K. Surskiy] Отец Иоанн Кронштадский // Internet: http://theme.orthodoxy.ru/saints/ioann.html
61 Лурье С.В. [S.V. Lurie] Историческая этнология: Учебное пособие для вузов. – М.: Академический проект: Гаудеа-
мус, 2004. – P. 495-497 ; See also: Абачиев С.К. [S.K. Abachiev] Указ. соч. P. 308-309.
62 Митин С.С. [S.S. Mitin] Государственная власть: понятие и закономерности организации: монография /
С.С. Митин; Федер. агентство по образованию, Краснояр. гос. ун-т, Юрид. ин-т. – Красноярск: РУМЦ ЮО,
2005. P. 8.
63 Патриарх Кирилл: «Те, кто отдает жизнь за Родину, искупает все свои грехи» // Internet: http://www.rusk.ru/
newsdata.php?idar=185379
64 Quote on: Моторина Л.Е. [L.E. Motorina] Философская антропология: Учебник для вузов. – М.: Академический
Проект, 2009. – 2-е изд. – P. 157.
65 See: Ibid. P. 42.
66 См.: Аристотель Никомахова этика // Аристотель. Сочинения. М.: Издательство «Мысль», 1984. – В 4 т. – Т. 4. – С. 150.
67 Рэнд А. [A. Rand] Деньги как барометр нравственности // Internet: http://www.sunhome.ru/philosophy/13555/p3
68 See: Гарр Т.Р. [T.R. Gurr] Почему люди бунтуют? – СПб.: Питер, 2005. – P. 61.
69 See: Ibid. P. 84, 89, 91.
70 Елисеев А.В. [A.V. Eliseev] Народность и элитарность // Internet: http://www.apn.ru/publications/article18940.htm
71 Quote on: Петрова Н.Г. [N.G. Petrova] Скопин-Шуйский / Наталья Петрова. – М.: Молодая гвардия, 2010. – P. 62.
72 Щедрин Н.В., Кылина О.М. [N.V. Schedrin, O.M. Kylina] Меры безопасности для охраны власти и защиты от нее/
Юрид. ин-т КрасГУ. – Красноярск: РУМЦ ЮО, 2006. – P. 52.
73 Quote on: Дробышевский С.А. [S.A. Drobyshevskiy] Указ. соч. P. 24.
74 Under the “see-saw situation” we understand the unstable balance of two opposite powers, each of them is trying to incline
the “political power scales” in its favour. E.g., see: Кургинян С.Е. [S.E. Kurginyan] Качели. / Конфликт элит – или раз-
вал Росси. – М.: ЭТЦ, 2008. – P. 152-153.
75 Платонов С.Ф. [S.F. Platonov] Смутное время. – СПб: Лань, 2001. – P. 401-402.
76 Джемаль Г.Д. [G.D. Jemal] Фузеи и Карамультуки. – М.: Социально-политическая мысль, 2010. – P. 95.
77 Троцкий Л.Д. [L.D. Trotsky] Преданная революция. Что такое СССР и куда он идет? // http://knigger.com/texts.
php?bid=17133&page=101
78 See: Ibid. P. 156.
79 Абачиев С.К. [S.K. Abachiev] Указ. соч. S. 6.
80 The author dedicated a separate article to this issue. See: Деятельность разведывательных служб как фактор, спо-
собствующий или противодействующий экстремизму // Социология, философия, право в системе научного
обеспечения процессов развития современного общества: материалы Всероссийской научно-практической
конференции (г. Красноярск, 20 мая 2010 года) / Отв. ред. Д.Д. Невирко. – Красноярск: СибЮИ МВД России,
2010. – P. 339-345.
Щипанов М. [M. Shipanov] Таинственный Емельян Пугачев // Internet: http://www.vmdaily.ru/article.php?aid=89886
82 Севастьянов А.Н. [A.N. Sevastyanov] Диалектика классового и национального (к постановке вопроса) // Internet:
http://www.sevastianov.ru/prochie-statji/dialektika-sotsialjnogo-i-natsionaljnogo-k-postanovke-voprosa--2.html
83 Гарр Т.Р. [T.R. Gurr] Почему люди бунтуют. – СПб: Питер, 2005. – P. 30-32.
85 Quote on: Jouver В. Творцы революций // Internet: http://ruska-pravda.org/index.php/2011122015868/stat-i/nit-vremeni/
2011-12-17-16-40-38.html
86 Томсинов В.А. [V.A. Tomsinov] Светило российской бюрократии: Исторический портрет М.М. Сперанского. – М.:
Мол. гвардия, 1991. – P. 76.
87 Жовер В. [V. Jouver] Указ. соч. Ibid.
88 Quote on: Ibid.
89 Quote on: Дробышевский С.А. [S.A. Drobyshevskiy] История политических и правовых учений. Основные класси-
ческие идеи : учебное пособие. – 2-е изд., доп. – М.: Норма, 2007. – S. 400.
90 See: Фролов С.С. [S.S. Frolov] Социология : учебник для вузов / С.С. Фролов. – 4-е изд., стереотипное. – М.: Гарда-
рики, 2008. – P. 130.
91 Абачиев С.К. [S.K. Abachiev] Социальная философия: учеб. пособие / С.К. Абачиев. – Ростов н/Д : Феникс, 2012. –
P. 284.
92 As M. Leonard claims, in the Saudi Arabia “all the traffics are concentrated in the hands of the only Internet provider
who filters the sites that do not please the spiritual leaders”. In China “computer experts’ teams use the network protection
systems that have filters of at least four different kinds”. Леонард, М. [M. Leonard] О чем думают в Китае? / Марк
Леонард, пер. с англ. И.В. Кузнецова. – М.: АСТ: АСТ МОСКВА, 2010. – P. 126-127.
93 Ibid. P. 129.
94 Переслегин С.Б. [S.B. Pereslegin] Самоучитель игры на мировой шахматной доске. – М.: АСТ; СПб.: Terra Fantastica,
2007. – P. 503
95 Quote on: Денисова А. [A. Denisova] Cyber H8 – ответный удар // Язык вражды против общества: (сб. статей) /
Сост. А. Верховский. – М.: Центр «Сова», 2007. – P. 218.
96 Денисова А. [A. Denisova] Указ. соч. P. 220.
97 Лебон Г. [G. Le Bon] Указ. соч. P. 10-11.
98 See: Политическое цунами. Аналитика событий в Северной Африке и на Ближнем Востоке / Под ред. С.Е. Курги-
няна. – М.: МОФ ЭТЦ, 2011. – P. 8, 22, 27 and further
99 Видеман, В.В. [V.V. Videman] Открытый спектр: новые технологии на службе у гражданского общества // Internet:
http://www.peremeny.ru/books/osminog/4855